Paynter & Anor v Hinch

[2013] EWHC 13 (Ch)

Case details

Case citations
[2013] EWHC 13 (Ch) · [2013] CN 231
Court
High Court (Chancery Division)
Judgment date
17 January 2013
Judgment text

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Subjects
Probate Wills and succession Knowledge and approval
Keywords
knowledge and approval probate action testamentary capacity suspicious circumstances partial knowledge and approval precatory words rectification
Outcome
claim dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Due execution of an apparently rational and fair will ordinarily satisfies the evidential burden of proving knowledge and approval. Where circumstances arouse suspicion, the propounder must affirmatively prove those matters on the balance of probabilities. The intensity of that inquiry depends on the degree of suspicion. A will may, in rare cases, be partly proved and partly rejected, but the court must examine the whole will and the surrounding circumstances. Vague precatory statements about intended gifts do not establish that the testator believed those intentions were incorporated in the will. A failure to read a straightforward will aloud, or an innocuous clerical error, does not necessarily arouse suspicion.

Factual background

This was a probate action concerning the validity of a 2004 will made by Abbie Hinch. Stephen Paynter and Victoria Darling sought revocation of the grant of probate and a grant in solemn form of Abbie’s 1996 will. They alleged that Abbie did not know and approve the contents of the 2004 will. The central issues were whether the circumstances surrounding execution aroused suspicion and, if so, whether Frank Hinch proved knowledge and approval.

Held

  1. The claim was dismissed. The 2004 will was duly executed and the court found no circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion.
  2. Due execution of an apparently rational and fair will ordinarily satisfies the evidential burden. If suspicion is aroused, the propounder must affirmatively prove knowledge and approval on the balance of probabilities.
  3. The choice of will-writing firm, Abbie’s mental state, the date-of-birth error and the failure to read the will aloud did not arouse suspicion. The will was straightforward and Abbie understood that the house was being left to Frank in recognition of his care.
  4. The evidence did not support allegations that Frank was tyrannical or exercised improper influence.
  5. The statements about jewellery were vague and precatory. They did not show that Abbie believed those wishes formed part of the will.
  6. Partial knowledge and approval is legally possible but rare. Any clerical omission might instead have supported rectification under section 20 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, but would not have justified refusing probate.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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