Creasey & Anor v Sole & Ors

A beneficiary does not qualify under a will merely because he works in a farming business. Where the will uses terms such as employee, partner and fulltime, those terms should be given their ordinary legal meaning. A shared family farming arrangement does not create an agricultural tenancy under section 2 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 unless the occupier has an exclusive right to occupy the land for agricultural purposes. Proprietary estoppel requires a sufficiently clear assurance, reasonable reliance and substantial detriment, assessed in the round. A beneficial interest in an undivided share of land does not itself confer a right to occupy the physical land under section 12 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996.

The claimants were executors of the wills of Kenneth and Constance Jenkins. The defendants were their six children. The dispute concerned the construction and administration of the parents’ wills, principally whether Michael Jenkins qualified for a gift of East Ashey Farm under his father’s will and the extent of land devised to him under his mother’s will.

Michael also claimed security of tenure under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, a proprietary estoppel, and a right to occupy land under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. Issues also arose concerning agricultural support payments and the classification of testamentary gifts under the Administration of Estates Act 1925.

1. The claim was determined in favour of the executors on the principal disputed claims. Michael did not qualify under clause 5(b)(i) of his father’s will. He was not a partner, and even if he could be regarded as an employee or manager, he was not working fulltime in the relevant business. His separate sole-trader business did not fall within the expression “such business”. East Ashey Farm therefore passed equally to the six children under clause 5(b)(iii).
2. The conditional gifts under clause 6.1 of the mother’s will were effective for Pamela and Richard, who granted the required options within the applicable extended period. The other conditional gifts failed, with the resulting shares passing to Richard and Michael. The trustees retained responsibility for defining the immediate garden, easements, buildings and yards where the will conferred that discretion.
3. The court had jurisdiction to construe the definitions of “Michael’s Land” and “Richard’s Land”. “Michael’s Land” did not include the Long Field. In the context, “the road itself” included the surfaced road, its verges and half the width of the eastern hedge to the middle of the root line.
4. Michael’s arrangement with his parents did not confer an exclusive right of occupation. The parents used the land and buildings for their own farming enterprise, even though Michael managed that enterprise. The arrangement was therefore not converted into a tenancy from year to year under section 2 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986.
5. Michael failed to establish proprietary estoppel. The evidence did not establish a sufficiently clear assurance. Nor did it establish reasonable reliance or substantial detriment. The claim had to be assessed in the round, with appropriate scrutiny of the evidence.
6. Michael had no right under section 12 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 to occupy the land. An interest in an undivided share did not amount to a right to occupy the physical land, and the purposes of the relevant trusts did not generally include making the land available for his occupation.
7. Michael was liable for damages for trespass from 1 October 2007 until possession. The court could take account of Single Payment Scheme receipts when assessing those damages. The executors had not established that he had to account for payments relating to land formerly farmed by the mother. The gifts in clauses 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 of the mother’s will were specific devises for Schedule 1, Part II of the Administration of Estates Act 1925.
8. The consequential orders, including possession and an inquiry as to damages, were adjourned for further hearing.

This was a first-instance judgment of the High Court (Chancery Division). The judgment determined the construction of the two wills and the related claims arising from the family farming arrangements.