Jones & Anor v First Greater Western Ltd

A railway operator leasing station premises may control access to private land and require licensed taxi drivers who wish to ply for hire there to obtain permits and pay a fee. The fixing of taxi stands on private railway land under taxi legislation and byelaws regulates the stands but does not confer an independent right of access. A licensing authority’s regulatory regime may operate alongside the landowner’s contractual conditions of access. The statutory protection against acquiring rights of way over railway approaches applied to public as well as private rights. Control of access to station land was a private act, so the operator was not a public authority for that function under the Human Rights Act 1998. The permit scheme was lawful, and, alternatively, proportionate.

The claimants, representing taxi drivers in Bristol, challenged a permit scheme introduced by First Greater Western Ltd for taxis wishing to ply for hire at Bristol Temple Meads. The scheme required an annual fee and compliance with conduct conditions. The claimants alleged that the taxi byelaws fixing stands at the station created a right of free access, that the station approach was a public highway, and that the scheme exceeded railway byelaw powers and infringed rights under article 1 of Protocol 1.

The claim also raised compromise, public-authority and proportionality issues. The court considered the effect of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, the Public Health Act 1925, the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, the Highways Act 1980 and relevant railway byelaws.

1. The claim was dismissed. The permit scheme was lawful and enforceable. The defence of compromise failed because no concluded agreement binding the claimants or individual drivers had been established.
2. The reasoning in Hulin v Cook [1977] RTR 345 was correct. Sections 37 to 68 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 created a licensing and regulatory regime, not a new right to ply for hire. Section 76 of the Public Health Act 1925 extended that regime to railway premises, with the owner’s consent, but conferred no right of access. Consent to fixing a stand was distinct from permission to enter the land and use it.
3. Section 63 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 imposed consultation requirements before varying the number of taxis at a stand. It did not displace the landowner’s power to regulate access, trading and conduct on private land. Taxi byelaws and landowner controls could operate concurrently.
4. The station approach was not a public highway. Use by taxi drivers and other members of the public had been permissive, not as of right. In any event, section 57 of the British Transport Commission Act 1949 prevented acquisition by prescription or user of rights over approaches to railway stations. The section covered public as well as private rights.
5. The Railway Byelaws 2005 remained capable of controlling taxis soliciting custom. The omission of the words “ply for” from byelaw 7 reflected modernisation and did not remove control over taxi activity. Byelaws 13 and 14 also supported the control of access, parking and vehicle use. The scheme was independently lawful under FGW’s rights as landowner, so any error in relying additionally on byelaw powers would not invalidate it.
6. FGW was not exercising a public function when controlling access to its station approach. It was acting as a private lessee and landowner. The gratuitous permission to access the station was not a possession under article 1 of Protocol 1. In any event, withdrawal on reasonable notice and the permit scheme struck a fair balance and were necessary and proportionate to legitimate aims including safety, traffic management and improved facilities.
7. The claimants’ compensation claim did not require assessment because the substantive claims failed. Permission to appeal was refused, although the claimants remained entitled to apply to the Court of Appeal.

The claim was brought in the High Court after interim injunction proceedings. The injunction application was compromised by undertakings pending trial. The High Court dismissed the substantive claim and refused permission to appeal.