Zielinski v Regional Court In Poznan Poland

In an extradition appeal, interference with the requested person’s private and family life must be weighed against the substantial public interest in extradition. There is no requirement to show exceptional circumstances. The seriousness and circumstances of the offence may be relevant to proportionality, but the court should respect the sentencing judgment of the requesting state and should not substitute its own view of the appropriate sentence. Delay may also be relevant, although its significance is reduced where the requested person caused or materially contributed to it. Extradition will remain proportionate where the Article 8 interests relied upon do not outweigh the public interest.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against District Judge McPhee’s order for his extradition to Poland to serve a 12-month sentence for theft. The offence had been committed in 2001 and the sentence, initially suspended, was later ordered to be enforced after the appellant failed to comply with a compensation order and had left Poland without notifying the authorities.

Before the Administrative Court, the principal issue was whether extradition would be disproportionate under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, having regard to the appellant’s relationship with and caring role towards his partner, who had significant health problems.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge had applied the correct approach to Article 8. The question was whether the interference with the private and family lives of the requested person and his partner was outweighed by the substantial public interest in extradition, including the public interest in convicted persons serving their sentences and the United Kingdom honouring its international obligations.
2. There was no test of exceptionality. The court was required to conduct an overall proportionality assessment. The partner’s ill health and dependence on the appellant were relevant, but she had accepted that she could manage without him. In the circumstances, those interests did not make extradition disproportionate.
3. The relatively low value of the theft and the possibility that a custodial sentence would not have been imposed in the United Kingdom could be considered. However, the court had to exercise caution before judging the sentence imposed by the requesting state. It did not know the conditions or sentencing policies prevailing there and could not impose its own view of the appropriate sentence.
4. Delay could in principle support an argument that return was oppressive. Its weight was substantially reduced because the appellant had left Poland without informing the authorities, remained in the United Kingdom without disclosing his whereabouts and failed to comply with the compensation order. The extradition order was therefore upheld.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 was dismissed.
• District Judge McPhee: On 13 March 2013, ordered the appellant’s extradition to Poland to serve the sentence.