Roger Ward Associates Ltd & Ors v Britannia Assets (UK) Ltd

For limitation under Limitation Act 1980 section 14A, the claimant must plead and prove when it first acquired the required knowledge. The court assesses the claimant’s actual knowledge before applying the reasonable-person standard. Knowledge requires awareness, in broad terms, of the essence of the alleged act or omission, the relevant damage and its attribution. It does not require certainty, knowledge of negligence, a fully particularised claim, or precise quantification of loss.

A prolonged planning dispute does not automatically postpone the limitation trigger until all appeals are exhausted. The trigger depends on the claimant’s knowledge, assessed on the evidence. A claim was therefore statute-barred where the claimant had sufficient knowledge by 2006, and in any event by 30 March 2007.

The claimant alleged that the defendants negligently advised in 2003 that planning permission was unnecessary to demolish fuel-storage tanks and that the site could be used for storage and distribution.

The claimant accepted that its contractual claim was statute-barred and relied on the extended limitation period for negligence under section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980. The Master concluded that the contractual claim was statute-barred but that the concurrent tort claim was arguable. The defendants appealed and sought strike-out or summary judgment.

The central issues were whether the claimant had advanced a proper case under section 14A(4)(b), what level of knowledge was required, and when that knowledge was acquired during the planning dispute.

1. Appeal allowed. The claimant’s claim was struck out and/or summary judgment was entered for the defendants.
2. The claimant bore the onus of pleading and proving that it first acquired the knowledge required by section 14A within three years before proceedings were commenced. The claimant had neither pleaded the provision nor provided evidence explaining what it knew, when it knew it, or why the necessary knowledge arose only later. That failure was fatal to the limitation argument.
3. The required knowledge was knowledge of the essence of the defendants’ alleged act or omission and the material facts concerning the damage and attribution. It was enough that the circumstances would reasonably cause the claimant to ask questions about the advice. The claimant did not need complete certainty, knowledge that it had a worthwhile cause of action, knowledge of negligence, or precise knowledge of the amount of damages.
4. The defendants’ advice was called into question in 2005–2006. During 2006 the defendants advised that a retrospective planning application was required, contrary to the alleged 2003 advice. The claimant therefore had the requisite knowledge in 2006. In any event, if knowledge depended on the Council’s action, it existed no later than 30 March 2007, when the Planning Contravention Notice was served.
5. The length of the planning process and the later exhaustion of appeals did not postpone accrual of knowledge until 2012. The claim was statute-barred on either analysis. The decision in R v Kuxhaus was distinguishable: it concerned the commencement of the compliance period after an appeal against an enforcement notice, not the date of damage or limitation knowledge.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): allowed the defendants’ appeal against the reserved judgment of Master Kay QC dated 25 January 2013, and struck out the claim and/or granted summary judgment.