Arranz v Spanish Judicial Authority

A conviction European Arrest Warrant must be read as a whole. It is sufficient if it gives the requested person the information needed to understand the basis of surrender, oppose it and raise any statutory bars; immaterial omissions do not invalidate it.

For extradition engaging Article 7, the applicable threshold is a real risk of a flagrant violation of that right. A domestic court should respect the requesting state’s assurance that it will comply with a pending Grand Chamber judgment. Where that assurance removes the risk of a flagrant violation, extradition need not be adjourned merely because a Strasbourg chamber has reached a different conclusion.

The appellant appealed against a Westminster Magistrates’ Court order for his surrender to Spain under a conviction European Arrest Warrant. The warrant related to terrorist offences and murder convictions carrying consecutive sentences totalling 2,232 years, later combined into a maximum effective term of 30 years.

The appeal raised three issues: whether the warrant complied with section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003; whether the request was an abuse of process because other sentences were not specified; and whether surrender would expose the appellant to a retroactive penalty contrary to Article 7, and consequently arbitrary detention contrary to Article 5. The central issue was whether the warrant and the proposed surrender disclosed a statutory or Convention bar.

1. The appeal was dismissed.
2. Under section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, the warrant must contain particulars of the conviction and sentence. The warrant must be assessed as a whole, having regard to mutual trust and confidence between the executing and requesting courts. It sufficiently explained the original convictions, the total sentences, the 30-year effective maximum and the remaining period to be served. The absence of fuller particulars of the 2000 final judgment did not matter.
3. The omission of sentences for other offences did not constitute an abuse of process. Applying Zakrzewski v Regional Court in Lodz, Poland [2013] 1 WLR 324, the question was whether the omitted information was material to the statutory scheme. It was not. The sentences specified in the warrant were independently sufficient to account for the remaining period, and Spain confirmed that no further imprisonment would follow for the other offences.
4. The appellant’s case was indistinguishable from Del Rio Prada v Spain (Application No. 42750/09), in which the Strasbourg Third Section held that retrospective application of the Parot Doctrine violated Article 7 and, insofar as it justified continued detention, Article 5. However, while the matter was pending before the Grand Chamber, this court could not itself follow or determine the chamber’s conclusion.
5. Following R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] AC 323, the appellant had to show a real risk of a flagrant breach of Article 7. The court treated the guidance on Article 7 in Ullah as applicable, leaving any reconsideration to the Supreme Court. The opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Curtea de Apel Constanta (Romania) v Radu (C-396/11) did not alter that approach: the relevant Luxembourg judgment did not decide the issue, the Framework Decision was not directly binding under sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, and the Convention authorities remained applicable.
6. There was no real risk of a flagrant breach. Spain’s courts had clearly stated that they would comply with the Grand Chamber’s decision. If the chamber judgment were upheld, the appellant would be released; if reversed, Article 7 would not assist him. The Minister’s reported remarks could not displace the judicial assurance.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Michael Snow ordered surrender to Spain on 1 February 2013.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against that order was dismissed.