Evans & Ors v Lloyd & Anor

Presumed undue influence requires proof of a relationship involving trust, confidence, dependence or ascendancy, together with a transaction that cannot be explained by ordinary human motives when viewed in its full context. If those prerequisites are established, the evidential burden shifts to the recipient to show that the transaction resulted from the donor’s free, independent and sufficiently informed will. Independent legal advice is relevant but neither essential nor conclusive.

The equitable doctrine of unconscionable transactions may apply to gifts as well as bargains. It requires a special disadvantage, oppressive terms and unconscientious conduct by the stronger party. Mere imprudence, inequality or an objectively disadvantageous transaction is insufficient.

The claimants, representing the estate of Wynne Evans, sought rescission of gifts by Wynne of two agricultural holdings to David and Elizabeth Lloyd. The gifts were challenged as presumed undue influence and unconscionable transactions. The defendants denied the allegations and counterclaimed for admission to probate of a purported lost will under which David was said to be residuary beneficiary.

The central issues were whether Wynne’s relationship with the defendants and the circumstances of the gifts raised an inference of undue influence; whether the gifts fell within the doctrine of unconscionable transactions; whether delay barred equitable relief; and whether Wynne had executed the alleged will.

1. Claim and counterclaim dismissed. The gifts were not set aside, and the evidence did not establish that Wynne died testate.
2. For presumed undue influence, the claimant must establish both a relationship of trust and confidence, dependence or ascendancy, and a transaction that calls for explanation. The transaction must be assessed in the round and in context. A large gift is not inexplicable merely because it comprises most or all of the donor’s property.
3. The relationship between Wynne and the Lloyd family was exceptionally close, but the evidence did not show that they managed his finances, directed his affairs or controlled his will. His dependence for accommodation and domestic support did not establish the legally relevant dependence.
4. The gifts were explicable by ordinary motives. Wynne regarded the Lloyds as his family, wished the agricultural land to remain with farmers, had no interest in wealth or independent farming, and wished to preserve his established way of life. The gifts were his idea and were not suggested by the defendants.
5. If the evidential burden had shifted, it would have been discharged. The gifts were voluntary and initiated by Wynne. The limited advice given by the solicitor was sufficient in the circumstances. Independent legal advice is a factor, not a legal requirement, and the requirement of a fully informed will must be applied practically.
6. The doctrine of unconscionable transactions extends in principle to gifts. The contrary observations in Langton v Langton [1995] 2 F.L.R. 890 were obiter and were not adopted. Relief nevertheless failed because, although Wynne was disadvantaged and the gifts were objectively disadvantageous, the defendants had not acted with the requisite moral culpability or unconscientiousness.
7. Estoppel would not have barred relief if the gifts were voidable while the alleged influence continued. The claim was, however, barred by laches: the delay, the apparent acceptance of the transactions and the defendants’ subsequent ordering of their affairs made it unjust to reopen them.
8. The alleged will was not proved. The evidence established only that a draft existed; no executed will was found, and the evidence did not justify an inference that it had been executed and subsequently lost.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.