Director of Public Prosecutions v Chajed

A magistrates’ court may use Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, section 142, only within its limited slip-rule function. It may correct a simple mistake or direct a rehearing by different justices where appropriate. It may not reconsider the merits of a pronounced guilty verdict after further submissions and substitute an acquittal. A procedural guide for obtaining breath specimens has no statutory force. Failure to follow it may affect the reliability of a specimen actually obtained, but is not a defence to failing to provide a specimen. An erroneous acquittal made in this way may be quashed, leaving the earlier guilty verdict in place.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by case stated from the South Essex Magistrates’ Court’s decision on 9 March 2012. The magistrates had first convicted the respondent of failing to provide a breath specimen under the Road Traffic Act 1988, but, after defence counsel raised a further procedural point concerning the MG DD/A form and Howard v Hallett [1984] RTR 353, they reconsidered the verdict and substituted an acquittal.

The appeal concerned whether the magistrates had power to reopen a pronounced verdict under section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, and whether the alleged failure to ask a question about stomach reflux meant that there had been no lawful requirement to provide a specimen.

1. Appeal allowed. The magistrates were wrong in law to find the respondent not guilty. The MG DD/A form was a guide to statutory procedures and had no statutory force: Director of Public Prosecutions v Coulter [2005] EWHC 1533 (Admin). Failure to follow every step of the form could affect the reliability of a specimen actually provided, but could not constitute a defence to a charge of failing to provide any specimen.
2. Howard v Hallett [1984] RTR 353 concerned a different statutory issue, namely the taking of more breath specimens than the legislation permitted. It had no relevance to the present failure-to-provide charge. The magistrates were therefore wrong to treat it as requiring a finding that there had been no lawful requirement.
3. Section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 is a limited slip-rule power. It permits correction of a simple mistake, or something akin to one, and may permit a rehearing by different justices. It cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or to enable a defendant to reargue the merits after a guilty verdict has been pronounced. The principle of certainty and finality applies: R v Croydon Youth Court, ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] 2 Cr App R 411.
4. The magistrates’ failure to invite the prosecution to respond before reversing the verdict was a serious procedural failure. The appropriate remedy for an erroneous decision on the merits was an appeal, including by case stated, rather than reconsideration by the same bench. The finality principle was also supported by R (Aitchison) v Sheffield Crown Court [2012] EWHC 2844 (Admin).
5. Quashing the purported acquittal left the guilty verdict standing. The matter was remitted to the same bench for sentence, unless reconstitution of the bench was impracticable.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the Director of Public Prosecutions’ appeal by case stated from the South Essex Magistrates’ Court. The purported acquittal was quashed and the earlier conviction remained in force.