Poonam v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Immigration officers must remain within the purpose and scope of a premises search warrant. A warrant authorising a search for named persons does not permit a random search of everyone present, although officers may question an individual whose conduct gives rise to reasonable suspicion. Separate statutory powers may justify questioning, arrest and detention.

A defect in the written authorisation for a warrantless home search may make that search unlawful without automatically invalidating subsequent detention. Detention is assessed under the Hardial Singh principles, and damages require proof of a sufficiently close causal connection between the breach and the loss claimed.

The claimant, an Indian student, was encountered during an immigration operation at a food shop. A magistrates’ warrant authorised a search for four named persons, none of whom was found. Immigration officers questioned the claimant, arrested and detained her, and later searched her home without a warrant for identity and nationality documents.

She claimed damages and other relief for unlawful questioning, arrest, detention, searches, interference with goods and related matters. The principal issues were whether the shop search exceeded the warrant, whether the questioning was oppressive, whether the home search complied with Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971, and whether any unlawfulness caused the detention or claimed loss.

1. Shop search. Under sections 15(6)(b) and 16(8) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a warrant must identify the articles sought so far as practicable, and the search must remain within the extent required for its purpose. The operation went beyond the warrant by assembling and questioning all staff. A random search for immigration offenders was unlawful: R v Chesterfield Justices, ex parte Bramley [2000] Q.B. 576.
2. The officers were nevertheless entitled to question the claimant because her attempt to remove her work fleece created reasonable suspicion. Immigration officers’ powers to examine, question, arrest and detain are separate from the power to search premises. The questioning fell within the guidance reflected in Singh v Hammond [1987] 1 WLR 283.
3. The claimant was cautioned and understood that she was free to leave. The failure to record the caution in the proper pocket book breached Code C, paragraph 10.13, but was treated as a technical breach. The questioning was not oppressive. In civil proceedings, an interview obtained without a prior caution is not automatically excluded, although oppression may substantially reduce its weight: Ghulam Yasim v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] EWCA Civ 707.
4. Home search. The authorising officer had to turn his mind to whether reasonable grounds existed under paragraph 25A of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971. Recording only “after arrest” did not identify grounds, because arrest was a precondition to the power. The search therefore breached the statutory requirement to record the grounds. The requirement of stringent compliance was reinforced by Bhatti v Croydon Magistrates Court [2010] EWHC 522 (Admin).
5. Detention and damages. The detention satisfied the four Hardial Singh principles. The defects in the shop and home searches were not sufficiently closely connected with the detention, which was based on the claimant’s answers under caution. Applying the approach in Kambadzi v SSHD [2011] 1 WLR 1299 and R(OM) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 909, substantive damages required proof on normal compensatory principles that the breach caused loss. Liability was established for the defective home-search authorisation, but the level of damages and consequential matters were reserved.