H v G (Adoption Appeal)

An adoption order, together with the absence of post-adoption direct contact, is permissible only where it is necessary, proportionate and effectively a last resort. On an appeal alleging an evaluative error, the appellate court asks whether the first-instance judge was wrong; it does not reweigh the evidence merely because another evaluation is possible. Permission to appeal under rule 30.3(7) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 requires a real prospect of success. That threshold requires no further elaboration and is not satisfied merely because an application is not fanciful, capricious, whimsical or absurd.

The applicant mother appealed against an adoption order concerning her daughter T, made by District Judge Harper on 30 November 2012. The District Judge had refused to set aside the placement order and had made no order for direct contact after adoption. The appeal challenged the evaluation of the evidence rather than the legal approach. The central issues were whether the District Judge had applied the necessary and proportionate last-resort approach correctly, whether his evaluation was wrong, and whether the permission threshold under rule 30.3(7) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 required elaboration.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The orders were grave, particularly because no order for direct contact after adoption had been made, but the District Judge had been aware of their significance and had evaluated the relationships with appropriate seriousness.
2. Following Re B (A child) [2013] UKSC 33, an adoption order of this kind may be made only where it is necessary and proportionate, and operates as a last resort in meeting the child’s needs.
3. The District Judge had not misunderstood the law. Although he had not expressly referred to Convention rights, his judgment showed that he understood the importance of the relationships involved. The absence of an express label did not affect the result.
4. The complaint was that the District Judge had weighed the evidence wrongly. The appellate question was whether he was wrong. On reviewing the history and the evidence, the court found no basis for concluding that his evaluation was wrong.
5. Under rule 30.3(7) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, an applicant must show a real prospect of success. The words require no further elaboration. The court declined to treat the threshold as a term of art or to define it by reference to the antonym fanciful, or to synonyms such as capricious, whimsical or absurd.
6. The court respectfully agreed with CR v SR [2013] EWHC 1155 (Fam), which considered the permission issue more fully. That observation did not affect the disposal of the adoption appeal.

1. High Court (Family Division): Appeal against the adoption order made by District Judge Harper on 30 November 2012 dismissed.