Mama Group Ltd & Anor v Sinclair & Anor

Defamation proceedings by trading companies should be struck out as an abuse of process only where they serve no legitimate purpose. The relevant question is whether a real and substantial tort has been committed and whether the proceedings offer a tangible or legitimate advantage proportionate to their costs and use of court resources. The possibility of vindicating reputation, together with evidence that publication caused reputational harm, may establish a legitimate purpose even where special damage is not pleaded. The power is draconian and must be exercised cautiously. The serious-harm requirements in Defamation Act 2013 did not apply to causes of action accrued before the relevant provisions commenced.

Mama Group Limited and Lovebox Festivals Limited brought libel claims against Daniel Sinclair and Alexandra Joseph concerning an email, flyer and Twitter publication alleging excessive violence by security staff at a music festival and urging recipients not to attend the claimants’ events.

The defendants applied under CPR 3.4(2)(b) and the inherent jurisdiction to strike out the claims as an abuse of process. They argued that the claimants had suffered no real damage and that continuation of the proceedings served no legitimate purpose. The central issue was whether the claims were sufficiently real and useful to justify a trial before a judge and jury.

1. Application dismissed. The claims were not an abuse of process and could proceed to trial.
2. The governing test was whether a real and substantial tort had been committed, or whether a trial could yield a tangible or legitimate advantage outweighing the disadvantages in expense and court resources, as explained in Jameel v Dow Jones [2005] EWCA Civ 75. Strike-out for abuse is a draconian power, as noted in Haji-Ioannou v Dixon [2013] EWHC 1505 (QB), but remains available where proceedings have no legitimate purpose.
3. The publications were plainly intended to damage the claimants’ reputations. The evidence showed that recipients had reacted and raised issues with them. The claimants could therefore recover real, rather than merely nominal, damages if successful, notwithstanding that they had not pleaded special damage.
4. The claimants had a genuine purpose in seeking vindication. Whether the publications damaged their reputation, and whether the claimants’ conduct concerning the security incident affected that reputation, were matters for the jury. The court could not itself provide vindication at this interlocutory stage.
5. At common law, a trading company with a trading reputation may recover general damages for libel without pleading or proving special damage where the publication tends to damage it in its business: Jameel v Wall Street Journal [2006] UKHL 44. The serious-harm provisions of Defamation Act 2013 were not yet in force and did not affect causes of action accrued before commencement.
6. The timing of the application did not itself prevent strike-out, but it supported the conclusion that the defendants had treated the claim as a potentially real claim requiring investigation. The court provisionally considered both parties’ costs estimates excessive and noted that the court retained powers to control disproportionate expenditure.

Not stated in the judgment. This was an interlocutory first-instance decision on an application to strike out claims before the listed jury trial.