Marton -Cum -Grafton Parish Council), R (On the Application Of) v North Yorkshire County Council

In a planning challenge, whether a new matter is a material consideration between a committee resolution and issue of the decision notice is an objective question. The Kides guidance applies with common sense, having regard to the particular facts. Evidence of planning need, without a logical connection to environmental effects, need not form part of an environmental statement under the EIA Regulations. A deficiency in an environmental statement does not ordinarily remove the planning authority’s jurisdiction. The adequacy and scope of the statement are generally matters of planning judgment reviewable on Wednesbury grounds. Environmental effects of combined heat and power pipes should be assessed where their installation and use are probable. On the evidence, that probability was absent.

The claimant parish council sought judicial review of planning permission granted by North Yorkshire County Council for a waste recovery park at Allerton Park Quarry. The challenge concerned alleged material considerations arising after the planning committee resolved to grant permission, the treatment and publicity of information about waste-treatment need, and the omission of combined heat and power pipework from the environmental assessment.

The court considered five remaining grounds. It had to decide whether the HM Treasury PFI report and Leeds planning reports were material considerations, whether evidence of need belonged in the environmental statement, whether the publicity requirements for further information applied, and whether the omission of CHP pipework was unlawful or irrational.

1. Ground one. The court granted permission to apply for judicial review but dismissed the substantive challenge. Under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, materiality is an objective question. The R (Kides) v South Cambridgeshire DC approach requires consideration of whether the authority knew or ought reasonably to have known of the matter. If so, the delegated officer must ordinarily refer it back unless satisfied that the authority knew of it, considered it with the application in mind, and would reach the same decision. The guidance must be applied with common sense, as explained in R (Dry) v West Oxfordshire District Council.
2. The HM Treasury report did not indicate that the project’s PFI funding was at risk and would not rationally have affected the decision. The Leeds projects were already known, remained unlikely to provide relevant operational capacity, and would not materially alter regional need.
3. Grounds two and three. Permission was refused. Schedule 4 to the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011 concerns information relevant to environmental assessment. It does not require evidence of planning need, which has no logical connection with environmental issues and may properly be addressed in a planning statement. The need updates were therefore not regulation 22 further information requiring newspaper publication. The mistaken description of part of the June material as regulation 22 information caused no wholesale confusion comparable with Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment.
4. Grounds four and five. Permission was granted, but the claims were dismissed on their merits. The scope and sufficiency of an environmental statement are matters of planning judgment, reviewable on conventional Wednesbury grounds. Where CHP installation and use are probable, their environmental effects should be assessed. Here no user, route, agreement or probable scheme had been identified. CHP remained an aspiration, so its exclusion was neither irrational nor unreasonable.