Bachanek v Regional Court In Warsaw, Poland

In extradition proceedings, a knowing fugitive cannot rely on the statutory passage-of-time bar. Delay may nevertheless be relevant under Article 8, but it may carry little weight where the person knowingly evaded justice. The English court must not impose its own assessment of the seriousness of the offences or its sentencing policy on the requesting state. Those principles are not displaced merely because the offences were committed when the requested person was aged 17, or because imprisonment followed breach of a suspended sentence.

The appellant challenged a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Poland on a conviction warrant. He had received a suspended sentence for four burglaries committed when he was aged 17. The sentence was later activated following an unclear breach. Fourteen years had elapsed, during which he had lived a law-abiding life in England.

He accepted that the statutory passage-of-time bar was unavailable to a knowing fugitive, but argued that delay, the minor nature of the offences, his age, and the activation of the sentence made extradition disproportionate under Article 8.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant was a knowing fugitive and therefore could not rely on the statutory bar under section 14 of the unidentified Act.
2. Under Article 8, lapse of time can count for very little where an appellant knowingly leaves the requesting state to avoid the consequences of criminal proceedings or sentence. The court must not substitute its view of the seriousness of the offending or appropriate sentencing policy for that of the requesting state. The approach in JP v The District Court at Usti Nad Labem, Czech Republic [2012] EWHC 2603 Admin was binding and applied.
3. The fact that the offences were committed when the appellant was 17 did not distinguish the case. The court left open whether substantially younger offending, such as at ages 12 or 13, might produce a different result.
4. Nor did it matter that the custodial sentence had been activated for breach of a suspended sentence rather than imposed directly for the original burglaries. Even if an English court might have reached a different sentencing decision, it was not for the court to tell the Polish court that its decision was wrong.
5. Although the judge considered the case unattractive and would have exercised discretion in the appellant’s favour if available, the binding principles required extradition.

The judgment states that the appeal was brought against an order of District Judge Snow ordering extradition. The High Court dismissed the appeal.