J (A Child), Re

A reporting restriction must be justified by a fact-specific and proportionate balance between a child’s privacy and the public’s freedom to discuss the family justice system. A child’s interests are a primary, but not paramount, consideration.

Where internet material identifies a very young child involved in care proceedings and will remain readily accessible, an injunction may exceptionally preserve anonymity after the statutory restriction ends. The order must be tightly drawn. Restraining publication of the child’s name may adequately protect privacy while allowing publication of anonymous images where this permits informed public debate without meaningful identification. The court must not use a child-protection order to confer indirect anonymity on social workers, a local authority or other professionals without compelling individual reasons.

The local authority sought a contra mundum reporting restriction and injunction concerning J, a baby who was the subject of ongoing care proceedings. J’s father had published material on Facebook and other internet sites identifying J and the family’s other children, despite earlier orders and undertakings.

The proposed order would have prevented publication of identifying information about J, the parents, the local authority, social workers, the children’s guardian and others until J reached adulthood. The central issues were whether J’s anonymity should continue after the care proceedings ended, how far the order should restrict online material, and whether it could extend to foreign-based internet providers.

1. The application was granted in a substantially narrower form. A contra mundum injunction was ordered until J’s eighteenth birthday. It restrained publication of J’s name, but not publication of images of J. It omitted restrictions that would in practice have discouraged identification of the local authority, social workers, the guardian and other professionals.

2. Section 97 of the Children Act 1989 protected J’s identity only while the care proceedings continued. The court nevertheless had power to extend anonymity by injunction. Although such post-proceedings orders would usually be exceptional, this was an unusual case. Existing online material was likely to remain accessible indefinitely, and J was the central subject of the publicity rather than an incidental participant.

3. The court applied the Article 8 and Article 10 balancing exercise. J’s welfare interests were a primary consideration, but the court also gave substantial weight to transparency, public scrutiny and the freedom to criticise family justice and local-authority practice. Restraint could be justified only to protect J’s privacy and anonymity, not because the publications were offensive, defamatory, criminal, or embarrassing to those criticised.

4. The proportionate distinction was between a name and an image. An unnamed baby was unlikely to be found through ordinary word-based internet searches or recognised merely from an image. Permitting anonymous footage allowed public debate about the care system to continue, while restraining J’s name substantially reduced the risk of meaningful identification.

5. The court rejected the draft’s broad provisions concerning professionals and the collection of information from the parents. They created a serious chilling effect and were not needed to protect J. A public-domain proviso was also inappropriate on these facts.

6. An injunction could in principle be made against foreign internet providers. However, absent evidence about foreign service and enforceability, the order had to include an undertaking that the local authority would not seek enforcement outside England and Wales without permission, together with adapted provisions protecting persons abroad.

This was a first-instance application within ongoing care proceedings concerning J. No appellate history is stated.