Wright v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

Police containment of demonstrators is lawful only where there is a reasonable apprehension of an imminent breach of the peace, the measure is necessary, and it is proportionate. The apprehension must arise from the circumstances as they develop; the mere imminence of a protected person’s arrival, or protesters’ reluctance to use a police pen, is insufficient by itself. The common-law power to prevent a breach of the peace remains available where the statutory power under section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 cannot be used, provided the common-law test is satisfied. Containment may be action short of arrest and may continue while the grounds for apprehending a breach remain. Minimal reasonable force may be used to effect it. Qualified Convention rights may yield to sufficiently strong public interests where the interference is necessary and proportionate.

The claimant sought damages against the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis for false imprisonment, assault and battery, and breaches of Articles 5, 10 and 11 of the Convention. He had been demonstrating outside Chatham House during a visit by the President of Israel and was contained in a police pen between shortly after 09:27 and 10:42 on 30 March 2011.

The police initially encouraged protesters to enter the pen voluntarily. Shortly after 09:27, after the claimant shouted that the President was present and beckoned fellow protesters, the senior officer ordered absolute containment. The central issue was whether the containment satisfied the common-law requirements of reasonable apprehension of an imminent breach of the peace, necessity and proportionality.

1. Claim dismissed. The claimant’s claims for false imprisonment, assault and battery, and breach of Convention rights failed.
2. The governing test for containment was that identified in Mengesha v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 1695 (Admin): there must be a reasonable apprehension of an imminent breach of the peace; containment must be necessary; and it must be proportionate.
3. The officers honestly believed that a breach was about to occur and, shortly after 09:27, had reasonable grounds for that belief. The claimant’s shouting and beckoning could reasonably be interpreted as liable to provoke one or more demonstrators to advance towards the presidential vehicle. Such an advance could cause a breach directly, or indirectly through preventive action by the police or Israeli security personnel.
4. The earlier circumstances did not suffice. The imminent arrival of the President, the reluctance of some protesters to enter the pen, and police convenience did not alone establish the necessary risk. The police bore the burden of justifying containment.
5. Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 was unavailable because its statutory preconditions were not satisfied. That did not exclude the common-law power, which could lawfully be used if its own test was met. Containment was action short of arrest and was not disproportionate merely because arresting individuals later might have been possible.
6. The grounds continued until the President’s departure. The officer reasonably considered the risk of an unexpected departure or an attempt to storm the building, and the continuation until 10:42 was necessary and proportionate.
7. The light physical contact used to move the claimant into the pen was reasonable force to prevent an imminently apprehended breach. Articles 10 and 11 were qualified rights, and the interference was minimal and justified by the public interests established by the findings.