Uddin, R (on the application of) v Crown Court At Leeds

Section 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 prevents judicial review of a Crown Court judge’s decision made during a trial on indictment to revoke the defendant’s bail. The prohibition concerns matters relating to the trial process, rather than only matters intrinsic to the indictment. Bail decisions made before trial, and decisions made after trial pending a retrial or another trial, remain capable of judicial review. Where judicial review is available, the decision is reviewed on Wednesbury principles, applied robustly in recognition of the Crown Court judge’s trial experience.

The claimant was being tried on indictment in the Crown Court for conspiracy to import heroin. During the fourth week of trial, the trial judge revoked his bail after finding that he had attempted to intimidate junior prosecution counsel in a car park.

The claimant sought judicial review, alleging that the decision was Wednesbury unreasonable and that relevant factors, including his previous compliance with bail, had not been properly considered. The central issue was whether a bail decision made during a trial on indictment fell within the exclusion in section 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

1. Jurisdiction. The claim was struck out for want of jurisdiction. Section 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 uses the broad phrase matters relating to trial on indictment. It prevents the High Court from reviewing decisions made within the trial process, including a decision during trial to revoke bail.
2. The relevant boundary is between the trial process and matters collateral to it. Decisions on bail before trial are collateral and may be reviewed. Decisions after trial, pending a retrial or another trial, may also be reviewable. Once trial has commenced, bail relates to the trial because its purpose is to secure attendance at that trial. The same reasoning applies to other decisions made within the trial process, as illustrated by TH v Crown Court at Wood Green & Ors [2006] EWHC 2683 (QB).
3. The approach was consistent with the reasoning in R v Manchester Crown Court ex parte DPP [1994] 98 Cr.App.R 461 and R (on the application of M) v Isleworth Crown Court and Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise [2005] EWHC 363 (Admin). The trial process is forbidden territory for judicial review, whereas genuinely collateral decisions may remain reviewable.
4. Alternatively, had jurisdiction existed, permission would have been refused. A challenge to a reviewable bail decision is governed by Wednesbury principles, applied robustly. The trial judge had heard evidence, rejected the claimant’s account, and was entitled to regard the alleged intimidation as serious. The decision was one which a reasonable judge could reach.
5. The claim was struck out. The transcript was directed to be sent to the trial judge. No order as to costs was made.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The claim was struck out by the Administrative Court for want of jurisdiction, with an alternative determination that permission would have been refused on the merits.