A v D (Parental Responsibility)

Applications to terminate a parent’s parental responsibility, change a child’s name and make a residence order are determined by the child’s welfare. Termination requires a high threshold and proof that retaining parental responsibility would be contrary to the child’s welfare. Relevant considerations include whether the parent could exercise any element of parental responsibility beneficially, whether continued responsibility would expose the child or primary carer to instability or risk, and whether the parent has shown meaningful commitment to the child. A name change may be ordered where it protects the child’s security, while respecting the child’s biographical integrity. A residence order may properly be made under Children Act 1898 even where there is no realistic competing carer, if it recognises and secures the established care arrangements.

The mother applied for three orders concerning her four-year-old son: a residence order, permission to change his forenames and family name, and termination of the father’s parental responsibility. The parents were unmarried, but the father had acquired parental responsibility by being registered on the child’s birth certificate. The father, who was imprisoned and did not attend the hearing despite being given notice and repeated opportunities to do so, did not formally oppose the applications. The child’s guardian supported all three applications.

The applications arose against a background of serious domestic violence, the mother’s post-traumatic stress disorder, the father’s lack of engagement with the child, and significant risks to the family’s confidential address. The issues were whether the orders promoted the child’s welfare and, specifically, whether the high threshold for terminating parental responsibility had been met.

1. Welfare and applicable principles. The court directed itself by reference to the welfare principle and welfare checklist in sections 1(1) and 1(3) of the Children Act 1898. It applied the factors governing a change of name identified in Re W, Re A, Re B (Change of name) [1999] 2 FLR 930.
2. Termination of parental responsibility. The court treated Re P (Terminating parental responsibility) [1995] 3 FCR 753 and CW v SG [2013] EWHC 854 (Fam) as persuasive. It adopted their approach. A relevant consideration was whether, if parental responsibility had not been held, it would now be granted. It was also relevant that no element of the bundle of responsibilities could, in present or foreseeable circumstances, be exercised by the father beneficially.
3. The high threshold for termination was met. The father’s serious violence, lack of engagement with the child, absence from professional assessments, and capacity to use parental responsibility to create further instability meant that retaining it would require intolerable dealings with the mother and risk undermining the child’s security. The child needed continuity and stability, and the father was unlikely to provide beneficial care or decision-making.
4. Name change. The welfare balance favoured changing the child’s distinctive names to reduce the risk of tracing the family and protect the stability of his home. The court nevertheless recognised the need to respect the child’s biographical integrity where possible.
5. Residence order. Although there was no realistic alternative carer and the local authority had no reason to intervene under Part IV of the Act, the no-order principle in section 1(5) did not prevent an order. A residence order appropriately recognised the established care arrangements and gave the mother additional security and judicial affirmation.
6. The residence order, name-change order and order terminating the father’s parental responsibility were made.