Pokusa v Circuit Court In Olsztyn & Anor

For an extradition offence, the warrant need only provide a sufficient factual indication of the alleged criminal conduct. An assertion that a person obtained a document by false pretences may establish fraud even where the warrant does not set out every detail of the foreign legal system or transaction.

For the passage of time to bar extradition under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the requested person must establish that return would be unjust or oppressive. Knowledge of an investigation, coupled with failure to comply with an obligation to maintain contact with the authorities, may justify treating the person as a fugitive. In any event, the passage of time alone is insufficient without evidence of resulting injustice or oppression.

The appellant challenged a District Judge’s decision ordering his removal to Poland under two European arrest warrants. One warrant concerned convictions for deception and embezzlement or fraud, for which a term of imprisonment remained to be served. The other concerned allegations of fraud and forgery.

The appellant argued that the description of one offence in the conviction warrant did not sufficiently disclose an extradition offence. He also relied on the passage of time under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, contending that return would be unjust or oppressive. The appeal under section 26 raised whether the warrant was sufficient and whether the statutory bar was established.

1. The appeals were dismissed. The court’s judgment covered both appeals, which raised no separate issues.

2. The description of the offence in the conviction warrant was sufficient. It alleged that the appellant had misled an employee and obtained a certification containing untrue circumstances by falsely stating that the original vehicle registration document had been lost. That was a clear allegation of false pretences and fraud. The court did not need the warrant to explain the full operation of the Polish system or establish that the document itself was false.

3. The District Judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant was a fugitive from justice in relation to the accusation warrant. The appellant knew that he was a suspect. Evidence indicated that Polish law required him to maintain contact with the authorities and notify them of his address, which he failed to do after leaving Poland. The absence of a specific order preventing him from leaving Poland did not invalidate that conclusion.

4. Even if the appellant could rely on the passage of time, section 14 was not established. Nothing before the court showed that he would be unable to deal with the allegations because of their age. Nor was there evidence that return would be oppressive. Oppression presents a high hurdle, which was not met on the facts.

5. Whether or not the fugitive-from-justice finding was correct therefore made no difference to the result. The statutory objections failed and removal to Poland remained ordered.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): appeals under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 dismissed.

2. District Judge Grant: ordered the appellant’s removal to Poland under the European arrest warrants.