Reed, R (on the application of) v Parole Board of England and Wales

The Parole Board’s task after recall is to assess whether continued detention is required for public protection and whether risk can safely be managed in the community. It is not confined to reviewing the correctness of the recall decision. The Administrative Court must not substitute its own assessment of risk or the weight given to relevant considerations. It asks whether the Board acted lawfully, considered the statutory directions, reached a decision within the range reasonably open to it, and gave proper, sufficient and intelligible reasons. Ambiguous wording will not invalidate a decision where the reasons, read overall, show that the Board understood the evidence and based its conclusion on a permissible assessment of risk.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Parole Board’s decision of 19 November 2012, following an oral hearing, to make no recommendation for his release after recall to prison. He had been convicted of serious sexual offences, maintained his innocence, and had been recalled after two USB memory sticks were found in his hostel room. He argued that possession of the devices did not breach his licence condition and that the Board had misunderstood the technology and placed improper weight on his failure to undertake offence-focused work.

The central issues were whether the alleged breach and the claimant’s possession of the devices had been misunderstood, whether the Board had lawfully assessed the risk of release, and whether its reasons were adequate.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Parole Board’s decision was within the range of decisions which a reasonable panel might make. The claimant’s costs were subject to no order, save for a public funding assessment.
2. The Board’s statutory task was to assess whether the claimant’s risk could be safely managed in the community. It was required to consider the wider picture, including the available risk assessments, supervision arrangements, rehabilitation work and public protection. Its responsibility was not removed by any possible defect in the original recall decision. This approach was consistent with K (on the application of J) v the Parole Board, [2010] EWHC 919 (Admin), and Gulliver v Parole Board, [2007] EWCA Civ 1386.
3. The Administrative Court could not substitute its own view for that of the Board, particularly on the assessment of risk or the weight given to competing considerations. The relevant questions were whether the Board acted according to the statutory directions, whether its decision fell within the range of decisions reasonably open to it, and whether its reasons were proper, sufficient and intelligible. The court applied the principles in James, [2009] UKHL 22, R (on the application of Scott Alvey) v Parole Board, [2008] EWHC 311 (Admin), and R (Gordon) v The Parole Board, [2000] EWHC 414 (Admin).
4. The Board appeared to understand the distinction between a USB storage device and an internet-access device. Its references to the absence of inappropriate material on the memory sticks supported that conclusion. Although parts of the reasoning concerning the claimant’s intended behaviour were unfortunate and capable of causing concern, the decision read as a whole was based on the broader risk evidence, including high assessed risk of harm to children and the lack of support from supervising professionals for release.
5. The Board was entitled to take account of the claimant’s failure to undertake offence-focused work where his continued denial of guilt made objective assessment of risk more difficult. The decision did not treat maintenance of innocence as an automatic bar to progression.
6. The possible weakness of the original recall trigger did not require release. Once recall had occurred, the Board was required to make the overall public-protection assessment, which it had done.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The court dismissed the claim against the Parole Board’s decision of 19 November 2012.