PBD & Anor v Greater Manchester Police

A police force did not owe a duty of care in respect of psychiatric injury allegedly resulting from disclosure of a protected person's identity or delay in admitting a partner to witness protection. The ordinary principles governing police liability applied. Even if a duty had existed, the alleged injury was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the relevant conduct, no breach was established, and the conduct did not cause entry into witness protection or the subsequent loss. A claim based on an alleged promise of financial support also failed where the evidence did not establish any concluded agreement or authorised offer.

The first claimant sought damages from the Chief Constable for psychiatric injury said to have resulted from the disclosure of his new identity to former criminal associates and his consequent entry into witness protection. The second claimant claimed £1,500 per month for six months, alleging that police officers promised this payment when discussing her entry into the scheme.

The court tried liability and causation separately from quantum. The issues were whether a duty of care existed and extended to psychiatric injury, whether any breach caused the first claimant's loss, and whether the second claimant had proved a binding agreement for financial support.

1. First claimant's claim. The claim was dismissed. Applying An Informer v A Chief Constable [2012] EWCA Civ 197, any relevant police duty would not extend to psychiatric injury where that injury was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct complained of. The alleged psychiatric loss was particularly remote because it arose from separation from the second claimant during the witness-protection process.
2. The broader principle in Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2009] 1 AC 225, reflecting the approach in Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] 1 WLR 1495, supported the conclusion that the police owed no such duty. The claimant was a suspect and prospective defendant, whereas the authorities themselves established that no general duty of care was owed to witnesses and victims.
3. Alternatively, no breach or causative link was proved. The police could properly charge the claimant, notwithstanding the risk that his identity might thereby be exposed, although protective steps might be appropriate. The claimant had wanted witness protection before the events at the police station. The decision to admit him was instead explained by the wider risk assessment, including the approach associated with the Stirland case.
4. The alleged psychiatric injury was caused, if at all, by the later process of assessing the second claimant's suitability and finances, not by any breach by the defendant. No duty existed to decide immediately to admit her to witness protection, and the delay resulted from the information and assessments required and from matters attributable to the claimants.
5. Second claimant's claim. The claim was dismissed. The court rejected her evidence and that of the first claimant concerning a promise of six months' salary. The contemporaneous records and the evidence of the police officers showed that financial arrangements remained subject to assessment and authorisation by Detective Superintendent Swan. No concluded agreement or authorised promise was established.

Both claims were dismissed.

Not stated in the judgment.