Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Ltd, R (On the Application of) v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government

A planning condition must be construed from the permission as a whole, including its express reason, and by asking what a reasonable reader would understand to be permitted. A condition can exclude rights under the Use Classes Order without using a fixed formula, provided its language and context make that intention sufficiently clear. Words such as only, combined with an exclusive list of permitted goods and a requirement for written consent to further trades, may achieve that result. The consistency principle requires regard to materially similar previous planning decisions, but does not require like outcomes where the permissions differ materially. Each permission must be construed in its own context.

The claimant sought under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an inspector’s dismissal of an appeal under section 195. The appeal concerned a refusal to grant a certificate of lawful proposed use under section 192 for unrestricted Class A1 retail use at a non-food retail park.

The claimant argued that a condition restricting sales to non-food bulky trades merely defined the ambit of the permission and did not exclude Use Classes Order rights. It also alleged inconsistency because another inspector, in the Hayes appeal, reached a different conclusion on a differently worded retail condition. The issues were whether the condition excluded unrestricted Class A1 use and whether the decision-making process was unlawfully inconsistent.

1. Claim dismissed. The inspector had correctly construed the planning condition, and there was no error of law in the decision letter.
2. A planning permission is generally construed within its four corners, including its conditions and the express reasons for them. The question is what a reasonable reader would understand was permitted, not what the parties intended. The reason for a condition may assist construction even where the wording appears clear.
3. The condition imposed a continuing restriction on the goods that could be sold. The words “shall be for” and “only” were mandatory and exclusive. The listed bulky trades were an exclusive list, because they were introduced by “which are”, rather than by words such as “such as”. Further trades required the council’s written consent.
4. The condition therefore excluded unrestricted Class A1 rights under the Use Classes Order. No particular verbal formula was required. The condition made no sense if unrestricted Use Classes Order rights continued, and its purpose of protecting the vitality and viability of Catford town centre reinforced that construction.
5. The consistency principle requires a decision-maker to have regard to previous planning decisions so that like cases are treated alike, while preserving the inspector’s duty to exercise independent judgment and give reasons for departure. It did not require a common inspector, recovery of both appeals, or identical results here. The Hayes condition was materially different: it used “such as”, contained no exclusive list, and imposed no requirement for further written consent.
6. The claimant was ordered to pay the Secretary of State’s costs. There was no order as to the interested party’s costs. Permission to appeal was refused because there was no reasonable prospect of success and the wider public-interest argument could not overcome the fact-sensitive construction required in each case.

First-instance judicial review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The court dismissed the claim and refused permission to appeal.