Alansi, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Newham

A substantive legitimate expectation may arise from a public authority’s clear and unqualified assurance. The assurance must be interpreted by asking what it would reasonably convey to the individual recipient, in light of that person’s background knowledge. Reliance and detriment are relevant but are not essential.

Where a public authority proposes to frustrate a substantive expectation, the court must balance fairness to the claimant against any overriding public interest. The authority must show that its decision is proportionate. The court must also respect the authority’s role in changing policy, particularly where the decision concerns scarce public resources and affects a substantial group.

The claimant had been housed in private accommodation under the defendant’s Bond Scheme. She had received repeated assurances that she would retain Priority Homeseeker status and could continue bidding for permanent council accommodation.

Following consultation, the defendant introduced a new allocation scheme and reassessed the claimant as a Homeseeker. This meant that she had no realistic prospect of allocation. The central issue was whether withdrawing her Priority Homeseeker status unlawfully frustrated a substantive legitimate expectation.

1. Clear assurance. The statements that the claimant would retain Priority Homeseeker status and could continue bidding were clear and unambiguous. They contained no qualification permitting withdrawal following a future change of policy. They reasonably conveyed an entitlement continuing while she remained in the accommodation obtained through the Bond Scheme.
2. Scope of expectation. The assurance did not prevent the defendant from changing the allocation scheme or altering the claimant’s relative priority within the Priority Homeseeker category. It prevented her removal from that overall category while the stated condition continued.
3. Applicable test. The defendant’s withdrawal of the benefit was prima facie unreasonable. The court had to decide whether frustrating the expectation was so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power. That required a proportionality assessment balancing the claimant’s interests against any overriding public interest. Procedural and substantive unfairness could both be relevant.
4. Reliance and detriment were not legal prerequisites. They were, however, material to the fairness balance. The claimant had relied on the assurances, although accepting the qualifying offer had also secured suitable accommodation sooner and did not guarantee eventual allocation of council housing.
5. The defendant’s policy objectives were legitimate. Housing scarcity, heavy demand, central government pressure and the aim of prioritising those in greater housing need justified reconsidering the position of persons already suitably housed. The change affected a significant group and lay substantially within the sphere of political policy-making.
6. The defendant had consulted, considered the policy change over an extended period, and provided individual review rights. Those safeguards, together with the limited and largely speculative detriment suffered by the claimant, made the change proportionate.
7. The claim was dismissed. The defendant’s conduct was not an unlawful abuse of power.

Not stated in the judgment.