Lee & Ors v Solihull Magistrates Court & Anor

A search warrant must identify, so far as practicable, the articles to be sought. Its scope must be intelligible from the warrant itself, without reference to information supplied to the issuing justice or to the understanding of executing officers. Failure to comply with PACE 1984, section 15(6)(b), makes the resulting entry, search and seizure unlawful, but does not necessarily invalidate the warrant. A warrant may nevertheless stand where the statutory conditions for its issue were satisfied. Judicial review is the appropriate forum for challenging the validity of the warrant. The court may grant a declaration of unlawfulness and make conditional orders for the return or retention of seized material.

The claimants sought judicial review of search warrants issued by Solihull Magistrates’ Court under PACE 1984 and executed by HMRC during an investigation into alleged excise-duty evasion and money laundering. They challenged the warrants and searches on three grounds: insufficiently precise identification of the articles sought; absence of reasonable grounds for believing that the material was relevant evidence; and failure by HMRC to make full and frank disclosure.

HMRC conceded that the entry, search and seizure were unlawful because the warrants lacked sufficient specificity. The remaining issues were whether the warrants should be quashed, whether alternative remedies existed, and what consequential relief should be granted.

1. Ground one succeeded. The warrants failed to identify, so far as practicable, the articles to be sought as required by PACE 1984, section 15(6)(b). The information before the magistrates identified the relevant offences and the connection with three named companies, but the warrant used vague and general categories.
2. The statutory safeguard requires the scope of the search and seizure to be ascertainable from the warrant itself. The warrant must be precise and intelligible by reference exclusively to its own terms. The fact that executing officers understood the investigation did not cure the defect.
3. Non-compliance with sections 15 or 16 makes the entry and search unlawful under section 15(1), but does not itself render the warrant unlawful. The additional challenge to the wording of the third category was unnecessary to decide.
4. Ground two failed. The information placed before the magistrates provided a sufficient basis for a justice of the peace to believe that an indictable offence had been committed and that relevant evidence of substantial value was likely to be found on the premises. A later administrative document using imprecise language did not establish that the wrong statutory test had been applied.
5. Ground three was not pursued. The claim was not filed promptly, but relief was not refused because important rights were involved and ground one had substantial merit. Neither an application under Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, section 59, nor a possible application under PACE 1984, section 78, constituted an adequate alternative remedy for challenging the validity of the warrants.
6. The warrants were not quashed because there had been a lawful basis for issuing them and no bad faith or serious failure in the warrant-application process. The claimants were granted a declaration that the entry, search and seizure were unlawful. HMRC was ordered to return the seized property and copies within 14 days unless it applied to the Crown Court under section 59(5) of the 2001 Act for authority to retain the material under section 59(7).