Scardfield, R (on the application of) v Police Appeal Board & Anor

For early payment of a deferred police pension, “permanently disabled” means permanently unable to perform the ordinary duties of a police officer until the applicable retirement date. It does not require disablement to continue for life. An incorrect interpretation of permanence will not justify quashing a decision if the error did not materially affect the outcome. The assessment of medical evidence is for the Police Medical Appeal Board. Judicial review examines legality, fairness and evidential sufficiency, not the merits of competing medical opinions. Where reputable medical evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that normal appropriate treatment has not been exhausted, the court should not substitute its own medical assessment.

The claimant, a former police officer with a deferred pension, sought judicial review of the Police Medical Appeal Board’s decision that he was currently unable to perform ordinary police duties but had not shown permanent disablement. The Board considered that further normal appropriate treatment remained available and rejected his appeal against the refusal of early pension payment.

The claimant challenged the Board’s interpretation of permanence, its assessment of the medical evidence, the expertise of one panel member, its reference to NICE guidelines, and several additional grounds. The central issues were the meaning of “permanently disabled” under the pension regulations and whether the Board’s decision was legally unsustainable.

1. Meaning of permanence. Under The Police Pensions Regulation 1987, disablement concerns inability to perform the ordinary duties of a member of the Force. “Permanently disabled” therefore means inability to perform those duties throughout the period up to the applicable retirement date. It does not mean inability to perform them for the remainder of the claimant’s life. The Board erred in law by adopting the latter interpretation (paras 26–28).
2. Materiality of the error. The error did not materially affect the decision. The Board’s operative conclusion was that it was premature to determine permanence because the claimant had not received normal appropriate medical treatment. The Board’s reasoning proceeded on that separate basis, not on the possibility that he might recover only after retirement (paras 22–23, 28, 43).
3. Medical evidence and judicial review. The Board was entitled to assess competing medical opinions. The court’s role was confined to reviewing legality, procedural fairness and whether there was an evidential basis for the decision. It was not entitled to decide which medical opinion was correct. The evidence was not all one way: Dr Stellar identified possible further treatment, and Dr Shenker’s evidence could support that view. The Board was entitled to prefer that evidence (paras 24–25, 30–31).
4. Panel expertise and NICE guidance. Dr Stellar was a consultant physician with relevant medical expertise because he had treated patients with complex regional pain syndrome since 1978. The reference to NICE guidelines was not the basis of the Board’s decision and was immaterial. The decisive reasoning concerned the availability of further normal treatment (paras 15, 32–34, 41).
5. The additional grounds were refused permission. The claim for judicial review and the application to adduce further grounds were dismissed (paras 35–43, 51).

The judgment describes earlier procedural orders concerning permission and delay, including permission granted by Hickinbottom J. This was a first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court; the claim was dismissed.