Chandra & Anor v Brooke North & Anor (Rev 3)

Orders made without a hearing take effect when made, although the court may revisit them before sealing where justice requires. The same broad, overriding-objective approach governs an application under CPR 23.10 to set aside such an order.

For limitation purposes under section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980, knowledge must concern the relevant damage and its attribution to the alleged negligence. In a complex professional-negligence claim, that knowledge may arise only after judgment in related proceedings clarifies the contractual rights, liabilities and consequences giving rise to the alleged loss.

Where proceedings are subject to an agreement to stay, the court retains jurisdiction to make orders, but the parties must not proceed until the stay is lifted.

Mr and Mrs Chandra and BPC Hotels Ltd brought related professional-negligence claims against Brooke North and Brooke North LLP arising from the redevelopment of a Manchester hotel. The claims concerned advice about finance arrangements, guarantees, security and mandatory step-in provisions in a deed of warranty.

The claims were issued in May 2009 and then stayed pending possession proceedings brought by the bank. Following judgment in those proceedings, the claimants applied to amend their particulars of claim and to add further claims. Master Eyre granted permission without a hearing on 15 November 2011. The defendants sought to revoke or set aside those orders, contending that the amendments introduced statute-barred causes of action and involved abuse of process.

The central issues were whether the Master’s orders remained effective, whether they could be revisited or set aside, and whether the proposed amendments were permitted by section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980.

1. The Master’s orders granting permission to amend were valid and took effect immediately when made. The parties’ agreement to stay the actions did not remove the court’s jurisdiction, although no party could proceed in breach of the stay until it was lifted.

2. The Master’s subsequent email stating that the orders would not be made without a hearing did not revoke them. It was an administrative direction that the existing orders should not yet be drawn up, sealed or served.

3. The former Barrell jurisdiction had been overruled by In the matter of L and B (Children) [2013] UKSC 8. The applicable approach was a broad consideration of justice under the overriding objective. Relevant matters included reliance and detriment, plain mistake, failure to draw attention to a relevant matter, new facts and any carefully considered change of mind. The same approach governed the applications under CPR 23.10.

4. The amended claims introduced new causes of action, but they were not statute-barred. The relevant knowledge under section 14A included knowledge of the material facts about the damage and knowledge that the damage was attributable to the alleged negligence. In this case, the necessary knowledge depended on the related judgment’s findings about the meaning and operation of the step-in provisions, the bank’s rights and the resulting financial consequences. The starting date was therefore no earlier than 28 January 2010. The agreed stay also meant that the claimants did not have a right to bring the amended claims until 15 November 2011.

5. The original claims were within the primary six-year limitation period. The amended and re-amended pleadings were permitted because they were not shown to be time-barred. Any questions concerning abuse of process, pleading deficiencies or allegations of concealment were matters for later case management.

6. Both Brooke North and Brooke North LLP had been joined as defendants from the outset and remained parties, subject to later case-management decisions. The defendants’ applications were dismissed. The amendment orders were to be drawn up, sealed and served; the claim forms and particulars of claim could be amended; the actions were transferred to the Technology and Construction Court; and costs were ordered or reserved as specified in the judgment.

Not an appeal. The judgment determined referred procedural applications arising from two related High Court claims.