Caborn -Waterfield v Gold & Ors

On an interlocutory application in defamation proceedings, the court must assess whether the words are capable of bearing the pleaded meanings and whether those meanings are capable of being defamatory. It should not resolve disputed facts, determine justification, or decide the present effect of old allegations on reputation where those matters require a trial.

A claim should not be struck out as an abuse merely because the allegations concern events many years earlier, publication has been extensive, or the claimant may be unable to pay costs. A claim in conspiracy concerning defamatory publications may be arguable, but defective pleadings should be amended before the claim proceeds.

The claimant brought two defamation actions concerning autobiographies published by members of the Gold family. The first concerned passages in Pure Gold, involving David Gold and Raceform Ltd. The second concerned passages in Please Let It Stop, involving Jacqueline Gold, Random House Group Ltd and Wendy Holden.

The defendants applied for rulings that the words were incapable of bearing the pleaded meanings, strike-out orders, and summary judgment. The claimant also pleaded conspiracy in relation to the second action. The court considered which meanings were capable of arising, whether they were defamatory, whether the claims were abusive or had no real prospect of success, and whether claims against the alleged author or contributor could proceed without clearer pleading.

1. Defamation meanings. The words in both publications were incapable of bearing a meaning that the claimant had an adulterous relationship with Princess Margaret. In the first action, meanings alleging blackmail, criminality, unlawful helicopter use, misappropriation of company money, dishonesty and irresponsible conduct were capable of being defamatory. Insults such as describing the claimant as dissolute or a drunkard were not sufficiently serious in context. In the second action, the meanings concerning unlawful helicopter use, misappropriation, failure to pay debts and irresponsible or incompetent conduct were capable of being defamatory. The meanings concerning adultery, a disreputable business, a dissolute lifestyle and pressuring an employee to change her name were not capable of being borne, or were not sufficiently serious.
2. Interlocutory limits. The court could not decide disputed facts on the limited evidence. The defendants had not put forward a defamatory meaning which they sought to justify. Questions concerning justification, the claimant’s present reputation, and the effect of publications outside the limitation period were matters for trial.
3. Abuse of process and remedies. The surviving meanings passed the threshold of seriousness. Extensive historic publication, delayed complaint, uncertain damages, possible inability to pay costs, and the potential relevance of Article 10 of the Convention and section 12(4)(a)(i) of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not justify striking out the claims. A successful libel claimant could normally expect an injunction where there was sufficient evidence of a risk or threat of further publication and an injunction would not be futile.
4. Conspiracy and publication. The claim in conspiracy was not struck out immediately. The claimant had to amend it because the existing pleading was inadequate. The claim against Wendy Holden was also not finally struck out; the claimant was given an opportunity to plead a proper basis for alleging that she published the words complained of. References to slander and malicious falsehood, unsupported by the body of the pleading, were struck out.
5. The applications to strike out the two claims in their entirety were dismissed. Parts of each claim relating to meanings the words could not bear were struck out. The conspiracy claim and claim against Ms Holden were liable to be struck out unless amended.