Coates, R (on the application of) v Bristol City Council

[2013] EWHC 4492 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2013] EWHC 4492 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
24 July 2012
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Planning law Judicial review
Keywords
certificate of lawfulness commencement of development material operation planning permission Town and Country Planning Act 1990 section 56 Wednesbury unreasonableness listed building consent judicial review
Outcome
claim dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

In deciding whether development has begun for planning purposes, the decision-maker must assess the development as a whole and reach an objective judgment on the evidence. Relevant matters may include the red-line site plan, approved or amended plans, discharged conditions and works carried out. The question is whether the works accord with the permission and are material rather than de minimis. Very little work may suffice. A certificate of lawfulness may concern proposed operations, so physical demolition is not necessarily required before development can be treated as begun. A decision will be unlawful only if the authority takes irrelevant matters into account or reaches a conclusion outside the range of reasonable planning judgments.

Factual background

The claimant sought judicial review of Bristol City Council’s decision to grant a certificate of lawfulness under section 192 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The certificate confirmed that works, including a boundary fence, drainage trenches, foundations and a manhole, had begun development authorised by planning permission and listed building consent relating to land at the rear of 17 Vyvyan Terrace, Bristol.

Permission to proceed was granted only on the ground that the committee’s decision was manifestly unreasonable. The claimant argued that the works were outside the approved development area, did not constitute material operations, and did not demonstrate commencement of demolition of the listed garage. The central issue was whether the committee was entitled to conclude that development had begun before the planning permission expired.

Held

  1. The claim was refused. The committee was entitled to conclude that development had begun for the purposes of section 56 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
  2. The correct approach was to consider the development as a whole and reach a factual judgment in light of all relevant matters. Those matters included the red-line site plan, the amended plans approved on discharge of conditions, and the works carried out. The red-line plan did not have to be considered in isolation.
  3. The authorities supported a broad and objective approach. In Malvern Hills DC v Secretary of State for the Environment [1982] 1 EGLR 175, the court had stated that very little work was needed to satisfy the statutory test. Riordan Communications Limited v South Bucks DC [2000] 1 PLR 45 supported asking whether the work was in accordance with the permission and material rather than de minimis. By analogy, R v Flintshire Council ex parte Somerfield Stores [1998] P&CR 336 supported a relatively broad approach.
  4. The works relied upon could constitute material operations even though some were outside the original red-line area, because the amended plans and discharged conditions were relevant to construing the permission. No irrelevant factor had been taken into account.
  5. Section 192(1)(b) permitted a certificate concerning proposed operations. It was therefore not necessary to establish that physical demolition of the garage, or the beginning of demolition, had occurred before development could reasonably be treated as begun.
  6. The Council was entitled to its costs of preparing the acknowledgment of service and summary grounds, assessed at £1,000 and payable within 14 days.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

This was a first-instance judicial review. HHJ Vosper QC granted permission on the manifest-unreasonableness ground and refused permission on the other two grounds. The claimant did not renew the refused grounds.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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