Mahmood v Mitsubishi Electric Europe BV & Ors

On summary judgment, the court must decide whether the claim has a realistic prospect of success, without conducting a mini-trial. The court may analyse the evidence and consider material reasonably expected to be available at trial, but should hesitate before finally determining disputed and complex factual issues. A claim should be dismissed summarily only where it is fanciful or bound to fail.

Where contractual claims depend on whether services caused or contributed to a contract being awarded, that causation question may require a trial even if the claim appears unusual. A restitution claim cannot proceed merely because the claimant’s services may have benefited defendants who were not contracting parties. The factual foundation of the alleged unjust enrichment must itself have a real prospect of success.

The claimant appealed against Master Bragge’s summary judgment orders concerning claims arising from consultancy services allegedly provided in connection with the Dubai Metro project.

The claims against Mitsubishi Electric Europe BV and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation included contractual claims for commission, damages and restitution. The claims against Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd and Mitsubishi Corporation were advanced in restitution. The Master allowed part of the claim against the first and second defendants to proceed, but dismissed the consortium-contract claim and the claims against the third and fourth defendants.

The claimant also sought permission to rely on further evidence. The central issues were whether the contractual causation allegations had a real prospect of success and whether the factual basis of the restitution claims was sufficiently realistic to justify a trial.

1. Summary judgment principles. The court applied the established approach under CPR 24.2. The question was whether the claim had a realistic, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. The court was not to conduct a mini-trial, but could analyse the evidence, consider contemporaneous documents and take account of evidence reasonably expected to be available at trial. It should hesitate before deciding complex factual issues summarily.
2. Claims against MEE and MELCO. For summary judgment purposes, the court proceeded on the assumption that the pleaded contractual terms were sustainable. The decisive question was whether the claimant’s services had led to, or were a consequence of, the consortium contract being awarded to a consortium including MHI and CORP. The fact that MELCO had unsuccessfully competed with that consortium did not conclusively determine that factual issue. The claimant’s case that he had promoted “Mitsubishi” generally, and that this might have influenced relevant decision-makers, was more than fanciful. The Master was therefore wrong, within the meaning of CPR 52.11(3)(a), to dismiss that part of the claim summarily.
3. The claim concerning sub-sub-contracts awarded to MELCO also required disclosure and trial. MEE and MELCO accepted that, once the consortium-contract claim was allowed to proceed, their cross-appeal seeking dismissal of the remaining claim could not succeed.
4. Claims against MHI and CORP. The restitution claim depended fundamentally on the assertion that MELCO had ceded its position to MHI and CORP under a secret arrangement, thereby passing to them the benefit of the claimant’s services. The evidence showed instead that a Sumitomo/MELCO consortium had competed with the successful consortium and failed to pre-qualify. The claimant had no relevant evidence beyond his disbelief of the defendants’ witnesses. That factual case had no real prospect of success.
5. Even if the claimant’s services had assisted MHI and CORP, that would not by itself make their retention of any benefit unjust. The claimant’s agreement was with MEE and MELCO, and any remedy lay in claims against those companies. The Master was right to dismiss the claims against MHI and CORP. No substantive order was made on the application to adduce further evidence.

1. High Court (Chancery Division): The court allowed the claimant’s appeal against the dismissal of the consortium-contract claim against the first and second defendants, dismissed their cross-appeal concerning the remaining claim, and dismissed the claimant’s appeal concerning the third and fourth defendants.
2. Master Bragge: On 27 April 2012, the Master dismissed the consortium-contract claim against the first and second defendants, allowed the remaining claim against them to proceed, and dismissed the claims against the third and fourth defendants.