Patterson, R (on the application of) v RSPCA

A person subject to an animal-keeping disqualification breaches it only where the evidence establishes participation in keeping animals or membership of an arrangement conferring entitlement to control or influence their keeping. Mere proximity, opportunity, or ability to intervene is insufficient. In a criminal case, an inference of guilt must be the only sensible inference available on the evidence.

Animal-cruelty liability remains available against the person responsible for the animals. That person must ensure regular inspection and appropriate veterinary attention, and access to fresh drinking water forms part of an animal’s needs.

The appellants were convicted by Newcastle-upon-Tyne Magistrates’ Court of offences under the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Mr Patterson was subject to a general disqualification from owning, keeping, participating in the keeping of, or being party to an arrangement concerning the control or influence of animals. The justices inferred from his residence with the animals and his wife’s absences that he participated in their care or was entitled to influence it.

Both appellants were also convicted on animal-cruelty counts. The central issues were whether the evidence established Mr Patterson’s breach of the disqualification, whether Mrs Patterson aided and abetted that breach, and whether Mrs Patterson was properly convicted as the person responsible for animals suffering through neglect.

1. The justices were entitled to find that Mr Patterson was able to influence the care of the animals, but that was not the statutory test. Section 34(2)(d) required proof that he was party to an arrangement under which he was entitled to control or influence how the animals were kept. Ability or opportunity to act did not establish that entitlement.
2. There was insufficient evidence that Mr Patterson had cared for the animals, assumed responsibility for them, or entered such an arrangement. His presence at the premises and the possibility that he might care for the animals during his wife’s absences did not make guilt the only sensible inference.
3. The authorities confirmed that the scope of a disqualification is fact-sensitive. The prohibition does not prevent every contact with an animal. An isolated intervention in an emergency may not amount to keeping, custody, or assuming responsibility.
4. Mr Patterson’s cruelty convictions could not stand because the evidence did not establish that he was legally responsible for the animals. Mrs Patterson was responsible for them, and the justices were entitled to find that the animals suffered unnecessarily through neglect. Her duty included sufficiently regular inspection and veterinary attention. Adequate access to fresh drinking water formed part of the animals’ basic needs.
5. The appeal was allowed in part. Mr Patterson’s convictions on all charges and Mrs Patterson’s conviction for aiding and abetting the disqualification breach were quashed, with not guilty verdicts substituted. Mrs Patterson’s four animal-cruelty convictions were upheld.

The judgment was an appeal by way of Case Stated from convictions entered by Newcastle-upon-Tyne Magistrates’ Court on 5 November 2012. The Administrative Court allowed the appeal in part and substituted not guilty verdicts on the specified convictions.