Z, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A framework governing the use of force during enforced removals is Convention-compliant where domestic law, training, operational guidance, risk assessment, medical safeguards, reporting and complaints procedures require force to be necessary, reasonable and proportionate. The absence of bespoke, accredited techniques for use in aircraft may justify improvement but does not itself establish a breach of Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR. A public authority may withhold detailed restraint techniques where disclosure would create a real risk to security, good order, or physical safety. The court need not inspect withheld material where its general nature is sufficiently established to conduct the required public-interest balancing exercise.

The claimant sought judicial review of the framework governing control and restraint during the enforced removal of persons from the United Kingdom by aircraft. He contended that the Use of Force Training Manual and the absence of aircraft-specific accredited techniques breached Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. He also challenged the defendant’s decision to publish only a redacted version of the Manual.

The Secretary of State maintained that the framework required necessary and proportionate force, supported by statutory authority, training, risk assessments, medical safeguards, reporting and complaints procedures. The central issues were whether the framework was Convention-compliant and whether withholding the redacted material was lawful.

1. The claim was dismissed. Both grounds of challenge failed. The Secretary of State for Justice was joined as an interested party.

2. The principles in Makaratzis v Greece (2005) 41 EHRR 49 and Putintseva v Russia [2012] ECHR 820 concerned the State’s positive obligations under Article 2 in circumstances involving potentially lethal force. They required an adequate legal and administrative framework and safeguards against arbitrary or abusive force. Those cases did not require the detailed and prescriptive regulation of every non-lethal restraint technique in the present context.

3. The domestic framework was supported by statutory authority under section 156(1)(b) and paragraph 2(5) of Schedule 13 to the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, operating standards, the Use of Force Manual, individual risk assessments, medical provision, mandatory reporting and complaints mechanisms. The framework required force to be used only where necessary and no more than was necessary. Its application to aircraft, although imperfect and in need of bespoke accredited training, was not thereby Convention-incompatible. R (Salimi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 422 confirmed the relevant scope of the statutory authority.

4. The evidence did not establish a systemic breach of Article 2 or Article 3. Individual misuse of force could justify investigation or disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings, but did not condemn the framework as a whole. The absence of aircraft-specific training was regrettable and arguably overdue, but did not establish non-compliance where the operational safeguards reduced unacceptable risks of serious injury.

5. The redaction challenge also failed. Applying the public-interest principles discussed in R (Lumba) v Secretary of State [2012] 1 AC 245, the court accepted that publication must provide sufficient information about the substance of a policy, subject to compelling reasons for withholding sensitive operational detail. Detailed restraint techniques could be counteracted by prisoners or detainees and could endanger staff, detainees and members of the public. The withholding decision was therefore lawful.

6. It was unnecessary for the court to inspect the redacted material. The general descriptions of the withheld techniques were sufficient to conduct the balancing exercise, consistently with Al Rawi v Security Service [2012] 1 AC 531 and the Court of Appeal decision reported at [2010] 3 WLR 1069.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. No earlier decision in the same proceedings is stated in the judgment.