Czyzyk v Regional Court In Szczecine Poland

Shortcomings by a person’s legal adviser will not generally establish an error of law in the decision under challenge. A person who leaves the requested state in breach of conditional release obligations may be treated as a fugitive from justice, weakening or defeating reliance on delay as a bar to extradition. Delay must be assessed against the period during which the authorities knew, or ought reasonably to have known, the person’s whereabouts. Hardship alone will not make extradition disproportionate under Article 8. The absence of directly affected family members and the short duration of a relationship may prevent an Article 8 or oppression argument from succeeding. An argument that conditional release should be treated differently because the sentence was not directly imposed was rejected on the facts.

This was an appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s order for the appellant’s return to Poland to serve approximately seven months remaining from a sentence imposed for serious burglaries.

The appellant argued that delay, oppression and Article 8 consequences created bars to extradition. He also criticised the representation provided by the duty solicitor before the District Judge, who had not advanced those arguments. Additional factual material concerning an alleged arrest in Poland was produced on appeal. The central issues were whether the statutory delay bar or Article 8 prevented return, and whether the appellant could rely on matters not advanced below.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court held that there were no proper grounds for saying that section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 or Article 8 prevented extradition.
2. Shortcomings by a legal adviser are not generally capable of establishing an error of law in the decision under challenge. The representation below did not justify criticism on the facts. The appellant’s solicitor had considered the available arguments and had concluded that they could not persuade the District Judge.
3. The appellant had left Poland in breach of the conditions of his conditional release and had failed to maintain contact with his probation officer. He was therefore properly regarded as a fugitive from justice. That was sufficient to defeat reliance on section 14. Even assuming that he might have shown that he was not strictly a fugitive, the alleged arrest evidence could have been placed before the District Judge. Applying the principle in Fenyvesi, it could not properly be relied on for the first time on appeal.
4. The relevant period of delay ran from the end of 2008. It was not substantial, particularly because the authorities were not immediately aware of the appellant’s precise whereabouts.
5. Although return would cause hardship, there was no directly affected family member. The relationship relied upon had lasted less than a year. Article 8 therefore provided no basis for saying that return would be disproportionate or oppressive.
6. The submission that departure should be viewed more leniently because it was not specifically intended to avoid service of the sentence was rejected. Each case turns on its facts, and these facts disclosed no bar to extradition.

High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 was dismissed. The District Judge’s order for return to Poland therefore stood.