Kepinski v Circuit Court In Katowice Poland

An appeal against an extradition order requires a properly arguable statutory or other legal bar to removal. A personal claim arising from an unrelated conviction, including an allegation of excessive imprisonment and a wish for compensation, does not provide such a bar. Where no proper ground opposing extradition is raised, the appeal must be dismissed. The court will not ordinarily include in its order a direction recording the period spent in custody pending removal, particularly where the relevant administrative authority normally notifies the requesting state of that period.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against District Judge Evans’s order for his removal to Poland to serve sentences for drug trafficking and drug supply offences. Before the district judge he had raised no opposition to extradition and had not consented. On appeal, he relied on an alleged overlong period of imprisonment for an apparently separate actual bodily harm conviction and sought compensation. The central issues were whether that complaint created any proper bar to removal and whether the custody period should be recorded in the order.

Appeal dismissed.

1. The appeal was brought under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003. The appellant’s stated grounds concerned an alleged conviction for actual bodily harm, an assertion that he had served longer than he should have done in prison, and a claim for compensation. Those matters did not constitute a proper basis for resisting extradition.
2. Counsel for the appellant accepted that no proper bar to removal had been raised or could be raised on his behalf. The court therefore dismissed the appeal against the order for removal to Poland to serve the relevant custodial sentences.
3. The appellant sought an order recording that he had spent 47 days in custody in connection with the European arrest warrant proceedings. The court declined to include such a term. The period could only be calculated up to the date of judgment, while the date of removal depended on practical matters including flight availability.
4. The court noted that SOCA’s practice was to notify the requesting state of the time spent in custody in the United Kingdom in connection with the extradition proceedings. The normal arrangements would therefore apply, with SOCA notifying the Polish authorities of the relevant period when removal occurred.

• High Court (Administrative Court): District Judge Evans’s extradition order was challenged under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003. The appeal was dismissed.