Jozwiak v District Court In Ostroleka Poland

In an extradition appeal based on delay, the passage of time may support oppression even where the requested person was not consciously evading justice. The court must assess the evidence and the practical consequences of extradition. The hardship to a dependent spouse may be reduced where adequate care is available from relatives or treatment can properly be obtained in the requesting state. Article 8 requires a proportionality assessment, but family illness and differences in welfare provision do not automatically make extradition disproportionate.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against District Judge Evans’s decision of 22 November 2012 ordering his return to Poland to face a charge of obtaining a passport by deception.

He relied on the lapse of time since the alleged offence in May 2004, alleging oppression, and alternatively on Article 8. The principal hardship relied upon concerned his wife, who had serious mental-health and care needs. The issues were whether extradition would be oppressive because of the delay and whether it would constitute a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights.

1. Appeal dismissed. The alleged offence was serious, although it had occurred in May 2004.
2. The District Judge was entitled to infer that the appellant may have known that he was at risk of arrest if he returned to Poland. The use of a false name and other aliases could explain difficulties in tracing him. However, the District Judge had not treated that inference as excluding reliance on the passage of time. The appellant therefore remained entitled to have oppression assessed on the evidence.
3. The evidence did not establish oppression. The appellant’s wife could be cared for by their adult son, who was already providing care while the appellant was in custody. The likely period of absence was also limited by the time already spent in custody and the probable sentence, if convicted.
4. The wife had returned to Poland for treatment since 2008 and could receive appropriate treatment there. The fact that welfare payments were less advantageous in Poland did not provide a sufficient reason for her to remain in the United Kingdom where treatment could properly be provided in Poland.
5. There was consequently no basis for concluding that returning the appellant would be oppressive or that extradition would be disproportionate under Article 8.

The appeal was dismissed.

• District Judge: On 22 November 2012, District Judge Evans directed the appellant’s return to Poland.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 was dismissed.