Wawrzonek v Polish Judicial Authority

Protection against extradition for delay requires more than delay alone. The requested person must establish both culpable delay and that return would be oppressive. A person found to be a fugitive from justice cannot rely on the statutory protection. Family hardship caused by imprisonment will not ordinarily amount to oppression without evidence of exceptional consequences, such as the absence of any means of support. A delay of about three years is not generally sufficient, viewed in context, to establish culpable delay. The court will ordinarily attach weight to an assertion made by the requesting judicial authority unless strong evidence undermines its reliability.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s order for his return to Poland to serve the balance of sentences imposed for burglary offences. The offences were committed in May 2007, the enforceable judgment was issued in August 2008, and the European Arrest Warrant was issued in October 2011.

He argued that the delay made his return oppressive within section 14. The District Judge found that he was a fugitive from justice and rejected the section 14 argument. The central issues were whether the appellant was a fugitive, whether the delay was culpable, and whether return would be oppressive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge was entitled on the evidence to find that the appellant was a fugitive from justice. The appellant knew that he remained liable to serve the balance of his sentence, yet chose to leave Poland and remain in the United Kingdom. That finding substantially affected his ability to rely on section 14.
2. The delay, considered in context, did not generally amount to culpable delay. The offences had been committed in May 2007, the enforceable judgment was issued in August 2008, and the European Arrest Warrant was issued in October 2011. Although the delay was unfortunate, the court had doubts that it could give rise to a section 14 claim. The court was also entitled to attach weight to the Polish judicial authority’s account unless strong evidence showed it to be unreliable.
3. In any event, delay alone was insufficient. Even if the delay were capable of being culpable, the appellant had to show that return would be oppressive. The loss of the appellant’s income while imprisoned in Poland did not establish oppression. His family remained in Poland, and there was no evidence that they would be left without support.
4. A separate Article 8 argument was not maintained and, in any event, removal would not be disproportionate where no family members in the United Kingdom were affected.
5. The usual order was made.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 dismissed. The court upheld the District Judge’s order for return to Poland.