Durowoju v Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)

For the purposes of the stale-complaint dispensation regime, the relevant incident is the loss of property, or the latest date on which that loss can reasonably be established. A failure to return property is not necessarily a continuing omission which prevents time from running. The complainant’s state of knowledge does not determine the incident date, although it may be relevant to whether there was good reason for delay. Decision-makers must determine the incident date on the available evidence. A communication is not a complaint merely because it passed between the parties; the complaint date may be determined from the evidence before the decision-maker. The regime permits relief from the full complaint-handling formalities where more than 12 months has elapsed and no good reason for delay is shown, or delay is likely to cause injustice.

The claimant’s jewellery was lost after items recovered from a burglary were held with property belonging to other victims. The Metropolitan Police later recorded a formal complaint after the claimant’s communication of 23 November 2011. It applied to the Independent Police Complaints Commission for dispensation under the statutory complaint-handling regime, relying on delay. The Commission granted the application on 23 December 2011.

The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that the loss was a continuing omission, that an earlier email constituted the complaint, and that there was good reason for the delay. The central issues were the date of the incident, the date of the complaint, and whether the delay was justified.

1. Application dismissed. The Commission’s decision to grant dispensation stood because there was no material basis for judicial review.
2. Under Police Reform Act 2002, section 13 and Schedule 3, read with regulation 3 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2004, the relevant period runs from the incident, or latest incident, giving rise to the complaint. The incident was the loss of the jewellery. It was not necessary to treat the failure to return it as a continuing omission. Decision-makers must do the best they can on the evidence to identify when property was irretrievably lost.
3. The Commission was entitled to treat 24 September 2010, when the claimant was told that the jewellery could not be found, as the latest possible starting date. The claimant’s knowledge of the loss was legally irrelevant to identifying the incident date, although it could be relevant to whether there was good reason for delay. The Commission’s equation of knowledge with actual loss was immaterial because the knowledge date could not precede the incident.
4. The Commission was entitled to treat 23 November 2011 as the complaint date. An unexplained and deleted February 2011 email did not establish that a relevant complaint had been made, particularly as it had not been relied on in the claimant’s representations.
5. Once the claimant knew that the jewellery could not be located, her general confidence in the police did not provide good reason for delaying more than a year before complaining. The statutory scheme was intended to provide relief from full formalities for stale complaints.