Dowland v The Architects Registration Board

Section 18(1) of the Architects Act 1997 gives the Board a broad discretion when deciding whether to re-enter a person erased from the Register. The discretion is not confined to competence, although competence is a separate condition under section 9(1)(c). The Board may consider whether the applicant has changed his attitude to professional responsibilities, together with public protection and public confidence. Refusal of re-entry is not a further sentence for the original misconduct. A challenge to matters other than continuing competence lies by judicial review, rather than the statutory appeal under section 22. The Convention and Charter rights relied upon did not make the refusal unlawful, and the statutory three-month appeal period prevailed over an inconsistent practice direction.

The appellant, a former architect, had been erased from the Register after the Professional Conduct Committee found unacceptable professional conduct arising from financial misconduct, bankruptcy, unpaid judgment debts and failure to report the bankruptcy. After the statutory minimum period of two years, he applied for re-entry while subject to a seven-year Bankruptcy Restriction Order.

The Board refused re-entry, relying on continuing concerns about his professional responsibilities, public protection and public confidence. He appealed under section 22(1) of the Architects Act 1997, arguing that the Board could refuse re-entry only for incompetence, that reliance on the later restriction order was unfair, and that the decision was disproportionate and incompatible with Convention and Charter rights. The court first considered whether the statutory appeal was available and, alternatively, whether the decision was unlawful on public law grounds.

1. Statutory route. The appeal failed. Section 18(1) of the Architects Act 1997 provides that an erased name must not be re-entered unless the Board directs it. That wording confers a broad discretion, to be exercised judicially and reasonably. Section 9(1)(c) imposes a separate requirement of continuing competence, but it does not restrict the section 18 discretion to competence alone.
2. Scope of the discretion. The distinction between unacceptable professional conduct and serious professional incompetence is maintained in the statutory scheme. Section 22 provides an appeal in relation to the competence stage, but not in relation to the Board’s other considerations when deciding whether to direct re-entry. Those matters may instead be challenged by judicial review on conventional public law grounds.
3. Fairness and relevant considerations. Refusal of re-entry after two years was not a re-sentence or an extension of the original erasure order. It was a fresh decision under section 18(1). The Board was entitled to consider the Bankruptcy Restriction Order, public protection and public confidence. Its stated concern was that the appellant had not demonstrated a changed attitude to his professional responsibilities.
4. Convention and Charter rights. The Board acted as a public authority. Professional life may fall within private life for Article 8 purposes, as illustrated by Niemitz v Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97, but not every interference with professional life necessarily engages Article 8. In any event, the refusal was in accordance with law and proportionate to protecting the public from unacceptable professional misconduct. A1/P1 concerned possessions, not a right to future income as a registered architect. The Charter did not prevent professional regulation by national bodies.
5. Time limit. Section 22(2) imposed a three-month period from service of notice. The practice direction could not override that statutory limit.
6. Disposition. The appeal failed. The court stated that the appellant would not have succeeded even if the matter had been properly framed as a judicial review claim.

The judgment describes an appeal to the High Court under section 22(1) of the Architects Act 1997 against the Board’s refusal of re-entry. The High Court held that the statutory appeal was unavailable for the matters relied upon and dismissed the appeal. It nevertheless considered the proposed public law grounds and concluded that judicial review would also have failed.