A City Council v DC & Ors

Where a freeing order is revoked, the care order made immediately before it revives automatically. The court has no discretion to substitute an interim care order or another order. The revived care order gives the local authority parental responsibility, while the former parents regain parental responsibility under the statutory scheme. Their procedural and Convention rights are protected by their ability to apply for contact or discharge of the care order. Former parents who made a declaration under section 18(6) of the Adoption Act 1976 should ordinarily still be served with an application to revoke the freeing order. The judgment also gives case-management guidance intended to regularise the child’s legal status swiftly while minimising disruption.

The local authority applied to regularise the position of a child who had been made subject to a care order and then a freeing order for adoption in 2006. The adoption placement broke down, and the child thereafter lived securely with long-term foster carers. The freeing order was revoked under the inherent jurisdiction in March 2012, and an interim care order was made.

The issue was the legal consequence of revocation. In particular, the court had to decide whether the original full care order revived automatically, whether an interim care order could instead be made, and how the former parents’ parental responsibility, Convention rights and participation in future proceedings should be protected.

1. Power to revoke. The court accepted, applying Re C (A Minor) (Adoption: Freeing Order) [1999] Fam 240 and Re J (Adoption: Revocation of Freeing Order) 2000 2 FCR 133, that the inherent jurisdiction may be used to fill the statutory gap where a freeing order has become redundant and no effective statutory application is available. The earlier revocation was therefore valid.
2. Automatic revival. Section 20(3)(c)(iia) of the Adoption Act 1976, as amended by Schedule 4 to the Adoption and Children Act 2002, was unambiguous. The word “revive” required the full care order made immediately before the freeing order to be restored automatically. The court had no residual discretion to replace it with an interim care order or to scrutinise a new care plan before revival. The interim care order was consequently otiose and was discharged.
3. Legal consequences. Revival restored the local authority’s parental responsibility under section 33 of the Children Act 1989. The former parents also regained parental responsibility under section 20(3)(b) of the 1976 Act. They could apply for contact under section 34(3) of the 1989 Act or seek discharge of the care order under section 39. This structure was compatible with Articles 6 and 8 because it regularised the child’s status while providing routes to challenge the continuing arrangements.
4. Participation and management. A section 18(6) declaration concerned future questions about adoption and did not ordinarily justify excluding a former parent from revocation proceedings. Former parents should therefore be served, subject to exceptional circumstances. The court issued guidance requiring notice, supporting evidence, early consideration of the child’s best interests, and directions for any application concerning contact or discharge, generally within 56 days. The guidance drew on KY v DD [2011] EWHC 1277 (Fam), Re A (A Child) [2012] UKSC 60 and the earlier ex parte authorities.

This was a first-instance application in the High Court (Family Division). The judgment records that the freeing order had previously been revoked by His Honour Judge Plunkett sitting as a High Court judge on 13 March 2012, with an interim care order made. This court determined the legal consequences of that revocation and gave further directions.