Monica Jane Ramnarine v Chandra Bose Ramnarine (Trinidad & Tobago)

Financial relief after divorce is a forward-looking exercise centred on the parties’ present circumstances and future arrangements. The statutory factors must be addressed rigorously, and a court should identify all relevant assets. Unexplained delay in delivering judgment may be unacceptable, but it does not alone justify a rehearing: the appellant must show that delay probably or possibly caused error and that the judgment is unsafe and unfair. Assets hidden or squandered may be notionally attributed to the party responsible. Evidence struck out by consent, where the other party had no opportunity to answer it, need not be considered on appeal.

The wife sought periodical payments, a lump sum and a settlement of property, including a life interest or right of occupation in the matrimonial home, under the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act. The High Court dismissed her claims and ordered her to vacate the home. The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal. Before the Board, she challenged the attribution of savings and jewellery to her, the finding that she retained an earning capacity, the refusal to consider evidence struck out by consent, and the lengthy delay in delivering judgment. The central issue was whether the delay or alleged errors made the judgment unsafe and required a rehearing.

The Board, in a judgment delivered by Lord Wilson, dismissed the appeal.

1. Section 27(1) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act imposed a duty to consider all the circumstances, including the specified financial and personal matters, and to exercise the statutory powers so far as practicable and justly. The assessment had to be rigorous. It was unfortunate that the judge had not referred expressly to every relevant matter; good practice was to identify all assets in a balance sheet.
2. The four-year delay between the hearing and delivery of judgment was entirely unacceptable. Financial relief proceedings require assessment of present circumstances and the making of fair future arrangements. Nevertheless, delay alone did not require a rehearing. The appellate court had to be satisfied that the judgment contained errors probably or possibly attributable to the delay and was unsafe or unfair to allow it to stand.
3. The Board found no significant consequential error in the judge’s reasoning. The updated and untested evidence did not justify reopening proceedings which had already lasted over 16 years. The wife had not established an entitlement to a rehearing.
4. The Board applied the principle in Martin v Martin ([1976] Fam 335) that assets hidden or squandered could be attributed back to the responsible party. It also accepted that squandering could constitute conduct relevant under the surviving statutory tail-piece. The Board proceeded on the footing that the sharing principle identified in Charman v Charman (No 4) ([2007] EWCA Civ 503; [2007] 1 FLR 1246) had a role in Trinidad and Tobago financial-relief applications.
5. It was not inherently improper for a judge to incorporate counsel’s submissions on a discrete issue. The Board approved the guidance in Crinion v IG Markets Ltd ([2013] EWCA Civ 587) that such incorporation should be acknowledged, the opposing case recited, and its rejection explained.
6. The Court of Appeal had not erred in declining to rely on evidence struck out by consent, particularly where the opposing party had no opportunity to answer it, notwithstanding section 39(3) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act.

1. Privy Council dismissed the wife’s appeal on 31 July 2013.
2. Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago dismissed the wife’s appeal from the High Court in an oral outline judgment dated 15 March 2010, later amplified by written judgment dated 19 October 2010.
3. High Court of Trinidad and Tobago dismissed the wife’s financial-relief claims on 8 February 2006 and ordered her to vacate the matrimonial home.