Bethel and others v The Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Bahamas (Bahamas)

Under section 6(3) of the Acquisition of Land Act, a notice of intended acquisition becomes conclusive evidence after 30 days that the land is needed for the public purpose stated in the notice. The provision does not make every aspect of the acquisition immune from challenge. Statutory time limits must be construed strictly, and genuine sham or ultra vires purposes may remain open to investigation. Compensation may be funded by a private developer where the statutory liability remains that of the promoters, and the funding requirement is not a mandatory condition invalidating the acquisition. A compensation claim cannot establish unconstitutional delay before the owner has pursued the statutory assessment procedure. Available statutory redress also precludes a substantially overlapping constitutional claim.

The appellants challenged the compulsory acquisition of their land for roads and related purposes connected with the Albany Project. They relied on the Acquisition of Land Act and article 27 of the Constitution, alleging that the stated public purpose was abandoned, that the compensation arrangements were unlawful, and that compensation had not been paid promptly or adequately.

Albury J made declarations concerning the legality of the acquisition and compensation. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision and remitted compensation assessment to the Supreme Court. The central questions before the Board were the scope and effect of section 6(3), the funding and payment of compensation, and the availability of separate constitutional relief.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Board advised that the appeal be dismissed with costs, with assessment of the value of the selected land and compensation remitted to the Supreme Court.
2. Section 6(3) made the notice conclusive evidence, after the expiry of 30 days without an appeal, that the land was needed for the public purpose stated in the notice. The Court of Appeal was wrong to treat this as only a rebuttable presumption. The statutory bar concerned the public-purpose issue, not every challenge to the legality of the acquisition.
3. The Board observed that a genuine sham or a purpose outside the statutory powers could remain open to investigation. Changes in a project’s components did not necessarily remove it from the stated statutory purpose. However, the abandonment principle could not reopen an acquisition fully implemented by appropriation and vesting under section 18, which transferred the land to the promoters while leaving compensation assessment outstanding.
4. The requirement in section 6(1) that compensation be paid out of public revenue or statutory-corporation funds did not impose a mandatory condition fatal to the acquisition. The statutory liability remained with the promoters, notwithstanding an agreement that Park Ridge would fund the compensation.
5. The constitutional claim based on delay failed. The statutory scheme contemplated negotiation followed, if necessary, by an application under section 15 for assessment. The owners had not attempted to formulate or secure determination of their claims and therefore had no valid complaint of delay.
6. Any overlapping constitutional challenge was barred by the proviso to article 28, since adequate statutory redress was available. The Court of Appeal’s reservation of a further constitutional challenge to the legality or merits of the acquisition could not stand, although a genuinely new claim based on unreasonable delay in determining or paying compensation could arise.

• Privy Council: The Board dismissed the appeal from the Court of Appeal and remitted assessment of the value of the selected land and compensation to the Supreme Court.
• Court of Appeal of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas: On 1 April 2011, Allen P, giving the single judgment, reversed Albury J and remitted compensation assessment, while purporting to reserve further constitutional challenges.
• Supreme Court of The Bahamas: In December 2009, Albury J made declarations that compulsory acquisition without prompt or adequate compensation contravened the Act and article 27, and that the appellants were entitled to possession in default of payment.