Abdul Martin Shizad v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

A tribunal must give a brief explanation for its conclusion on the central issue, but reasons need not be lengthy where the decision read as a whole coherently explains the result by reference to accepted material.

An inadequacy of reasons may be an error of law. It will not normally justify setting aside a First-tier Tribunal decision where there was no legal misdirection, its fact-finding is sound, relevant country guidance was considered, and its conclusion was reasonably open on the primary facts. The Upper Tribunal must assess whether the evidence, viewed cumulatively and to the reasonable-likelihood standard, supported the finding of future persecution.

The appellant, an Afghan national, appealed the refusal of his asylum claim. The First-tier Tribunal accepted his account, including his links through his brother-in-law to a Taliban supporter, and found that he faced persecution by the Afghan authorities on account of imputed political opinion. It therefore allowed the appeal.

The Secretary of State successfully challenged that finding on the ground that the First-tier Tribunal had given inadequate reasons. The decision was set aside for remaking, without challenge to the primary credibility findings. The Upper Tribunal considered whether the accepted evidence, country material and updated material supported a real risk that the appellant would be perceived as a Taliban supporter and subjected to detention and ill-treatment.

1. The appellant’s appeal was allowed. The Upper Tribunal re-made the decision and held that he had a well-founded fear of persecution and should be recognised as a refugee.

2. The First-tier Tribunal had a legal duty to explain its conclusion on the central issue. However, adequate reasons need only be brief where the determination as a whole makes sense in light of the material accepted by the judge. An error arising from inadequate reasons will not ordinarily require the decision to be set aside if there was no misdirection of law, the primary fact-finding is unimpeachable, relevant country guidance was considered, and the conclusion was reasonably open on the evidence.

3. On the reasonable-likelihood standard, the accepted evidence supported more than a speculative risk. The appellant came from an area of high insurgency; the authorities detained relatives of persons perceived to be anti-government entities; and material emerging after his account gave significant support to his claim that his brother-in-law had been detained at Bagram. It was reasonably inferable that the authorities would take an interest in a young man linked to that individual, notwithstanding uncertainty as to precisely what the brother-in-law had said in detention.

4. The passage of time did not fundamentally alter the risk. The appellant had left after being asked to attend for questioning, was now older, and current material continued to show detention of relatives of anti-government entities and ill-treatment by Afghan security forces. The First-tier Tribunal’s conclusion was therefore supported by the evidence and was open to it.

• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): The earlier error-of-law determination set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision for remaking because of inadequate reasons concerning imputed political opinion. On remaking, the Upper Tribunal allowed the appellant’s appeal.

• First-tier Tribunal: On 23 July 2012, Judge Adio allowed the appellant’s asylum appeal. The Secretary of State appealed.