C v Secretary of State for Justice

Anonymity in judicial review proceedings is governed by CPR 39.2 on a case-by-case basis. Mental patients do not enjoy a general or legal presumption of anonymity. The exceptions recognised in Scott v Scott concern the court’s protective and administrative jurisdiction over persons under disability, not public-law challenges concerning leave or release from secure psychiatric detention. Open justice and the public interest in understanding decisions about the risks posed by dangerous offenders may justify disclosure, although protection from media intrusion or attack remains a relevant, generally limited consideration.

The appellant, a convicted double murderer detained in a medium secure psychiatric hospital, challenged the Secretary of State’s refusal to consent to unescorted community leave. The substantive judicial review claim was dismissed by Mr Justice Cranston. An anonymity order made at the outset was discharged at the end of the proceedings, subject to protection for the hospital and its staff. The appellant appealed only against the refusal of anonymity. The central issue was whether his status as a mental patient, tribunal practice in mental-health cases, victim participation legislation, or risks of media intrusion and physical attack required anonymity.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge was entitled to refuse an anonymity order, while maintaining concealment of the hospital’s and staff’s identities.
2. Anonymity is a derogation from open justice. Under CPR 39.2(4), the court must first ask whether non-disclosure is necessary to protect the interests of a party or witness and then exercise its discretion. There is no legal presumption that mental patients should be anonymous in Administrative Court proceedings.
3. Scott v Scott did not assist the appellant. The passages concerning wards and persons under disability addressed the court’s paternal, administrative jurisdiction over private or domestic affairs. They did not establish a wider principle for modern public-law litigation concerning the risk posed by release or leave of absence.
4. The practice and rules of the First-tier and Upper Tribunals did not require the Administrative Court to adopt a corresponding presumption. This case concerned a public-law challenge to the Secretary of State’s assessment of community risk. Given the notoriety of the offences, there was a public interest, including the interests of bereaved families, in knowing why unaccompanied community leave remained unsafe.
5. The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 was irrelevant to the anonymity question. Protection from media intrusion or physical attack could be material, but carried limited weight because the risk was not materially different from that faced by notorious offenders released from prison and was less immediate while leave had been refused.

The court proceeded on the common-law basis. Reliance on articles 8 and 10 of the Convention would not strengthen the appellant’s case.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal from the Administrative Court dismissed. The court upheld Mr Justice Cranston’s refusal to grant anonymity, while leaving undisputed protection for the hospital and staff identities.
• Administrative Court — The substantive judicial review challenge to the Secretary of State’s refusal of consent to unescorted community leave was dismissed. An anonymity order was discharged, subject to concealment of the hospital and staff identities.