Vicente & Anor v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

Procedural fairness in an informal planning hearing is fact- and context-specific. Objectors must receive notice of the hearing, know the main points advanced in support of the application, and have a reasonable opportunity to raise their own points. If that opportunity is denied, the issue is whether they suffered material prejudice. A failure to notify objectors of an initial hearing may be cured by a properly notified fresh hearing, provided they can address any material advanced earlier. A shorter second hearing does not itself establish unfairness where the main issues are revisited and adequate participation is possible.

Taylor Wimpey UK Limited sought planning permission for 100 houses in Great Dunmow. Uttlesford District Council refused permission, but an Inspector allowed Taylor Wimpey’s appeal after a hearing at which local objectors had not been notified. A second hearing was held after the omission was discovered, and the Inspector again allowed the appeal. The objectors challenged the decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Collins J quashed the decision, holding that the second hearing remained procedurally unfair. The Secretary of State and Taylor Wimpey appealed. The central issue was whether the second hearing cured the notification failure and whether the objectors suffered material prejudice.

Disposition

The appeals were allowed and the order of Collins J was set aside. The Inspector’s decision was not vitiated by procedural unfairness.

1. Applicable standard. Procedural fairness in an administrative or quasi-judicial process is fact- and context-specific. An informal planning hearing has fewer formal features than an inquiry. Under Rule 11 of the Town and Country Planning (Hearings Procedure)(England) Rules 2000, it is an Inspector-led discussion, ordinarily without cross-examination and with limited formal evidence.
2. Content of fairness. In a section 78 planning appeal determined by hearing, objectors must be notified of the hearing and its time and place, know the main points relied on in support of the application, and have a reasonable opportunity to put forward their own points. Fairness does not require them to hear every word heard by the Inspector. The relevant question is whether any lost opportunity caused material prejudice.
3. Cure and application. The initial failure to notify could have been cured if the objectors had been apprised of the material advanced at the first hearing and given a reasonable opportunity to comment. On the evidence, however, the Inspector treated the second hearing as a fresh hearing. The same agenda was used, the main parties restated their cases, and objectors were able to address the relevant issues, including agricultural land, the National Planning Policy Framework, housing supply, alternative sites and the balance between housing need and countryside harm.
4. Shorter hearing. The second hearing was shorter because the principal parties had already presented their cases and certain undertakings no longer required discussion. That did not demonstrate unfairness or material prejudice. The argument that the appeal had only one realistic outcome was not necessary to decide and was difficult in a case involving planning judgment and an Inspector’s disagreement with the local authority.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeals and set aside the order of Collins J.
2. Administrative Court: On an application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, Collins J quashed the Inspector’s decision and directed that the planning appeal be reheard: [2013] EWHC 2713 (ADMIN).