Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v First-Tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) & Anor

For compensation under a scheme requiring injuries to be directly attributable to a crime of violence, the court must consider the nature of the offence, not merely its consequences. The facts of the particular offence are relevant, but injury, foreseeable injury, or the known dangerousness of an instrument or animal does not by itself make an offence violent. Whether the offence amounts to a crime of violence is primarily for the tribunal of fact, subject to review where the circumstances are incapable of supporting that conclusion or the decision is irrational. Negligently allowing an aggressive dog to escape, contrary to Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, was not capable of being characterised as a crime of violence on the facts found.

A 14-year-old claimant was seriously injured after swerving into the road to avoid an aggressively barking dog. The dog’s owner was prosecuted under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, but the prosecution was discontinued.

The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority rejected the claim because the injuries were not directly attributable to a crime of violence. The First-tier Tribunal allowed the claim and awarded compensation. On judicial review, the Upper Tribunal upheld that decision: [2012] UKUT 444 (AAC). The Authority appealed, raising whether an offence had been committed and whether it was a crime of violence.

1. Appeal allowed. The First-tier Tribunal could rationally find that the owner had committed an offence under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. The offence is committed where a dog is dangerously out of control in a public place, and aggression towards a person will almost always provide grounds for reasonable apprehension of injury. The absence of a conviction did not prevent the tribunal finding that the offence had been committed.
2. The scheme itself did not define crime of violence. The governing principle, followed from Ex parte Webb [1987] Q.B. 74 and approved in Jones [2013] UKSC 19, is that classification depends on the nature of the offence rather than its consequences. The particular circumstances must nevertheless be examined, because an offence may be capable of being committed with or without violence.
3. The classification is primarily for the tribunal deciding the facts. On judicial review, the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal may interfere where the circumstances are incapable of amounting to a crime of violence or the tribunal’s conclusion is irrational. The tribunal’s reasons should be read benevolently, and appellate courts should exercise caution before interfering.
4. The owner had, at most, negligently failed to prevent the dog escaping. There was no finding that she deliberately released it to attack anyone. The tribunals concentrated on the consequences of the offence, including the dog’s known aggression, rather than its essential nature. That was insufficient, and the offence was not open to be characterised as a crime of violence.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed the appeal from the Upper Tribunal’s decision.
• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): upheld the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on judicial review: [2012] UKUT 444 (AAC).
• First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber): found that the injuries were directly attributable to a crime of violence and awarded £499,155.