Houchin v Lincolnshire Probation Trust

Summary judgment under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, Part 24 is reserved for claims that are fanciful, hopeless or bound to fail. The court must not conduct a mini-trial on incomplete evidence. Where liability depends on interconnected, disputed and fact-sensitive questions, and a fuller trial may add to or alter the evidence, the high threshold is not met.

In the untargeted-malice form of misfeasance in public office, an ulterior or improper motive is not a necessary element. The absence of such a motive does not defeat a claim alleging that a public officer knowingly acted beyond power and probably caused injury by deliberately distorting material.

Houchin appealed from Supperstone J’s order granting the Lincolnshire Probation Trust summary judgment on his claim for misfeasance in public office: [2013] EWHC 794 (QB). The claim alleged that an employee, Michael Gilbert, deliberately distorted risk material in reports recommending Houchin’s removal from open to closed prison conditions, causing loss of liberty. The Trust accepted vicarious liability and that the loss of liberty constituted special damage.

The appeal concerned whether the claim was properly characterised as untargeted malice, whether the evidence could establish deliberate distortion, bad faith and causation, and whether those contested issues could fairly be resolved summarily.

1. Appeal allowed. The judge had applied summary judgment principles too restrictively to the appellant’s case and had not adequately addressed the pleaded allegations or causation case.
2. Under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, Part 24, summary judgment requires a high threshold. The procedure is intended for claims with no real prospect of success which are fanciful, hopeless or bound to fail, where there is no compelling reason for a trial. It must not become an abbreviated trial on incomplete evidence. The formulation in Standard Bank plc v Via Mat International Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ. 490 was applied.
3. The claim was advanced principally in the untargeted-malice form of misfeasance in public office described in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1. An ulterior or improper motive was not an essential element. Although motive could assist a fact-finder in drawing an inference, the judge’s reliance on the absence of motive could not dispose of the claim.
4. The central issues were fact-sensitive. They included whether inaccuracies in the LISP4 and LISP3 reports were deliberate distortions, whether other professionals’ views were genuinely independent or influenced by Mr Gilbert, and how those matters affected causation. The evidence could not be resolved without an impermissible mini-trial, and a fuller trial might add to or alter the available evidence.
5. The Parole Board’s opinions were not determinative, but the evidence arising from its lengthy and thorough hearings could assist in assessing the case’s complexity and suitability for summary disposal. The relevance or admissibility of the Board’s opinions at trial was left to the trial judge.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). On 18 June 2014, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Lady Justice Sharp gave the judgment; Lord Justice Lewison and Lord Justice Patten agreed.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division. Supperstone J granted the respondent summary judgment on 9 April 2013 under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, Part 24: [2013] EWHC 794 (QB).