Grenville College London Ltd & Anor, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Judicial review claims concerning sponsor licences may be dismissed as academic where the claimant identifies no practical benefit, claims no damages and cannot show recoverable prejudice. Sponsor guidance is not a contractual code fixed for the life of a licence. The Secretary of State may apply guidance subsequently in force, subject to ordinary public law duties.

Procedural fairness does not invariably require prior notice before suspension or reduction of a sponsor’s CAS allocation. The question depends on the circumstances, including the seriousness and immediacy of the concerns and whether the sponsor had a meaningful opportunity to make representations.

In context, “you” in the guidance included relevant persons controlling the sponsor, and selling a business included selling all its shares.

Grenville College London Ltd and Birmingham College of Law and Management challenged decisions concerning their Tier 4 sponsor licences. The decisions included reducing or suspending CAS allocations, suspending or revoking highly trusted sponsor status, and requiring applications for new licences following changes of ownership.

The Defendant contended that the claims were academic because both colleges had subsequently obtained A-rated licences and could identify no continuing benefit or compensable loss. The colleges also alleged procedural unfairness and argued that paragraph 615(b) of the sponsor guidance did not cover a transfer of shares because the companies had continued trading.

The central issues were whether the claims served any practical purpose, whether fairness required prior notice of the suspension decisions, and how the relevant sponsor guidance applied to changes of ownership.

1. Academic claims. The claims were dismissed because they offered no practical benefit. Neither claimant sought damages, no evidence of loss or prejudice was produced, and the subsequent A-rated licences meant that reinstatement of the earlier status would not provide an identified advantage. A judicial review claim should not be pursued merely to recover costs or to support a later damages claim which would constitute an abuse of process.
2. Procedural fairness. The common law duty of fairness applied to the Secretary of State’s exercise of powers under the sponsor guidance. It did not create a universal requirement for prior notice before suspension or a reduction of CAS allocation. The decision-maker had serious and immediate concerns about compliance, record-keeping, ownership, access to the sponsor management system and the suitability of the sponsors. In each case the claimants had an opportunity to make representations, and they had not shown that earlier notice would have affected the outcome. The challenges would therefore have failed on their merits even if they were not academic.
3. Notification period. The 28-day period for notifying a change of ownership was a period within which the sponsor had to notify the Defendant. It was not a period which the Defendant had to allow to expire before taking action.
4. Paragraph 615(b). The guidance had to be read as a whole and in light of the purpose of the Tier 4 scheme. “You” included a relevant person, and selling a business included selling all its shares. A contrary construction would allow control of a sponsor business to change without the Defendant being able to reassess the persons controlling it. The later wording clarified, rather than changed, the policy.
5. Alternative grounds. The Defendant was not confined to paragraph 615(b). Other guidance provisions and a residual discretion enabled her to respond to a significant change in the sponsor’s circumstances. In any event, the same decisions could and probably would have been taken. The judicial review claims were dismissed.