AB & Anor, R (On the Application Of) v Huddersfield Magistrates' Court & Anor

A warrant application must satisfy the statutory safeguards in Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the duty of full and frank disclosure. Where material sought may include legally privileged material, the applicant must disclose facts making that possibility foreseeable and significant. The warrant itself must identify the articles sought with sufficient precision that the occupier can understand the legitimate ambit of the search. A warrant which fails to limit broad categories of documents to material connected with the investigation is invalid. Information need not disclose every intelligence source, provided the issuing court has material capable of supporting the required reasonable belief. A short stay does not necessarily amount to occupation for the purposes of section 18(1), which requires a connection capable of supporting the belief that relevant evidence will be found on the premises.

The claimants, solicitors and family members of a man wanted for murder, challenged a specific-premises warrant issued under section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The warrant authorised searches of their home for electronic devices, identity documents and financial or property documents. The police had not disclosed that the claimants were solicitors or that privileged material was likely to be encountered.

The claimants also challenged searches carried out under the warrant, a search under section 18 of the Act following the arrest of a relative who had stayed overnight, and a later search authorised by an investigating officer. The central issues concerned disclosure, the precision of the warrant, the sufficiency of the intelligence, the meaning of occupation under section 18(1), and the legality of execution.

1. Warrant application and legal privilege. An applicant for a warrant must make full and frank disclosure. In this case, knowledge that the claimants were criminal solicitors made it foreseeable and highly likely that the broad categories of electronic and documentary material described in the warrant would include legally privileged material. That fact was material and had to be disclosed. The failure was fatal.
2. Precision of warrant. Under sections 15(2)(c) and 15(6)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the articles sought must be identified so far as practicable. The warrant had to be judged as a free-standing document. Its categories were not limited to material connected with assisting the wanted person to disappear or remain at large. The warrant therefore failed the statutory requirement and was invalid. The court cautioned that even narrower suggested wording might not, without more, satisfy the Act. [22]-[28]
3. Intelligence and reasons. The issuing court was entitled to form the required reasonable belief from information derived from multiple sources. The police were not required to disclose every source or conduct a full audit of the intelligence. The absence of recorded reasons was not, in this ordinary case, a separate ground of invalidity. [29]-[32]
4. Execution. Because the warrant was unlawful, the contingent powers under section 50 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 were unavailable. A search of vehicles within the curtilage was permissible, but a vehicle outside the curtilage was not authorised. The court did not determine the complaints concerning photographs, video footage or allegedly seized items. [33]-[43]
5. Section 18 search. Occupation under section 18(1) has no fixed duration or formulaic definition. The arrested person’s presence must be such as to support a reasonable belief that evidence relating to the relevant offence will be found on the premises. An overnight stay, without more on the disclosed facts, did not establish occupation. [44]-[47]
6. The court granted permission, quashed the warrant, invited submissions on consequential relief and ordered that the claimants’ identities must not be disclosed. [54]-[55]

The judgment describes a rolled-up permission hearing directed by Blake J and heard before this Divisional Court. No separate appellate decision is stated.