A Council v LG & Ors

In care proceedings, a finding that a parent fabricated or induced illness does not, without more, establish that the parent physically abused the child. Factitious illness behaviour and physical abuse require separate analysis. Physical-injury findings must be based on the evidence concerning each injury, including inconsistencies in accounts, the surrounding circumstances and the events considered together. Where a parent gives lies about a material issue, the court must consider whether there is a reasonable explanation. If there is none, the court may conclude that the parent was responsible for the injury or knows how it occurred but has not disclosed the truth. The local authority bears the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities.

These were care proceedings concerning GS and LS. The local authority sought findings under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 after the mother admitted fabricating symptoms and medical histories, including epilepsy, a brain tumour, allergies and medication histories.

The parents accepted that the threshold criteria were satisfied. The court was asked to determine disputed issues concerning fractures suffered by GS and LS and an abdominal wound suffered by LS. The central questions were whether the mother had given truthful accounts, whether any injury was non-accidental, and whether she was responsible for the injury or knew the true circumstances but had not disclosed them.

1. The parents’ admissions established that the threshold criteria under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 were satisfied. The local authority’s burden of proving the disputed factual allegations was the balance of probabilities, applying Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] 2 FLR 141.

2. The diagnosis of factitious disorder by proxy and the mother’s admissions of fabricated illness could not be used to infer that she had physically abused the children. The expert evidence showed that factitious illness behaviour and physical abuse were distinct matters and that their coexistence was exceptionally rare. Any finding of physical abuse therefore had to stand or fall on the evidence relating to the individual injury.

3. In assessing the physical injuries, the court considered the inconsistencies in the mother’s accounts, the surrounding circumstances of each event and the three incidents in the round. The court applied a modified Lucas direction: it considered whether there was a reasonable explanation for lies about a material issue and, if there was none, whether the only proper conclusion was that the mother was responsible for the injury or knew the truth and had withheld it.

4. The allegation concerning GS’s fractured arm was not proved on the balance of probabilities. The mother had given one consistent account, and the medical evidence regarded it as plausible.

   In relation to LS’s abdominal wound, the court found that the mother had not given a truthful account and was culpable for the injury, but did not find that she had directly inflicted it. In relation to LS’s later arm fractures, the court rejected the mother’s accounts, found that the injury occurred while LS was in her sole care, and concluded that the mother was culpable and had failed to disclose the true cause.

5. The findings indicated a grave and high risk of physical, emotional and psychological harm to the children. Final orders were reserved for a later hearing.

not stated in the judgment.