Case details
Summary
A challenge to a compulsory purchase order under the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 is, in effect, a statutory judicial review. Ordinary Wednesbury principles apply. Where a decision interferes with a constitutional or fundamental right, the decision-maker must provide substantial public-interest justification.
The court reviews legality, rationality and adequacy of reasons. It must not reweigh the merits or substitute its own assessment for that of the inspector or Secretary of State. Reasons must address the principal controversial issues, but need not mention every material consideration or argument.
Factual background
Mufasa Ltd challenged the confirmation of a compulsory purchase order affecting properties in Burnley. It alleged that the inspector and Secretary of State had failed to consider its asserted forfeiture and ownership interests, had used the wrong statutory power, and had acted incompatibly with its Convention rights.
The order had been made under section 226 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to facilitate redevelopment. Mufasa argued that section 17 of the Housing Act 1985 should have been used instead. The central issues were whether the decision-makers had considered the principal objections, adopted a lawful and rational approach, and struck a proportionate balance between private rights and the public interest.
Held
The claim was dismissed. The court treated a challenge under sections 23 and 24 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 as, in effect, a statutory judicial review. The principles stated in Chesterfield Properties Plc v Secretary of State for the Environment [1998] 76 P & CR 117 were adopted. Wednesbury principles applied, with substantial public-interest justification required where a decision diminished a constitutional or fundamental right.
The exercise of judgment and the weighing of competing considerations were matters for the inspector and Secretary of State. The court could not review the merits or permit the challenge to become a rehearing of the arguments. The decision had to be read fairly, as a whole and without excessive legalism.
Reasons had to be adequate and intelligible, enabling an informed reader to understand the conclusions on the principal important controversial issues. It was unnecessary to address every material consideration or argument. The approach in Bolton Metropolitan DC v Secretary of State for the Environment and Others [1996] 71 P & CR 309 was applied.
The inspector had recorded and considered the claimant’s objections, the council’s responses and the Convention-rights arguments. The asserted forfeiture was presented in the objections principally as relevant to the value of the claimant’s financial interest and compensation. The inspector was not required to determine the validity of the forfeiture. His failure to address the different characterisation advanced in the judicial review did not make the decision irrational or unlawful.
The choice between section 226 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and section 17 of the Housing Act 1985 was for the decision-maker. The inspector gave coherent reasons for concluding that section 226 was appropriate for comprehensive redevelopment. The claimant had not shown that that conclusion was Wednesbury unreasonable or otherwise unlawful.
There was no evidential basis for alleging that the compulsory purchase process had been used for an improper purpose, and no unfair or rubber-stamping approach had been established. The challenge therefore had no substance and was dismissed.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
The judgment describes an objection inquiry before an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State confirmed the compulsory purchase order by decision letter dated 1 August 2013. The High Court dismissed Mufasa Ltd’s subsequent statutory challenge.
Key cases cited
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Cases citing this case
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