Groves v Studley

Contributory negligence requires an assessment of both parties’ causative potency and blameworthiness. Under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, section 1, the court must make a broad, just and equitable apportionment based on the claimant’s share in responsibility for the damage. A claimant’s unreasonable conduct may justify a substantial reduction, but it does not eliminate the defendant’s responsibility where the defendant could have avoided or substantially reduced the danger. The absence of a material witness may support an adverse inference where there is already evidence requiring an answer and no credible explanation for the absence.

The claimant suffered catastrophic brain injuries after jumping onto the bonnet of a car driven by the first defendant, who then drove along a lay-by and the adjoining road before swerving to dislodge him. Primary liability had been admitted. The preliminary issues were whether the claimant was contributorily negligent and, if so, the appropriate apportionment of liability between the claimant and the insurers liable under the Road Traffic Act 1988.

The court determined the factual circumstances of the claimant’s conduct, the defendant’s opportunities to stop or slow, causation and comparative blameworthiness.

1. The court applied the principles in Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324. An adverse inference may be drawn from the absence or silence of a witness who might reasonably have material evidence, but only where the other party has first adduced some evidence giving rise to a case to answer. A credible explanation for the absence may reduce or nullify the inference.
2. Under section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, the claimant’s damages are reduced to the extent the court considers just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in responsibility for the damage. Applying Stapley v Gypsum Mines [1953] AC 663 and Eagle v Chambers [2003] EWCA Civ 1107, the assessment required consideration of both causative potency and blameworthiness.
3. The claimant had behaved aggressively, had chased the other vehicles and had failed to move out of the Peugeot’s path. He therefore bore substantial responsibility. The first defendant nevertheless drove initially towards him, failed to stop or slow substantially after the claimant was on the bonnet, continued driving a considerable distance and deliberately swerved to dislodge him. Those acts caused the injuries and amounted to dangerous driving.
4. Responsibility was apportioned 60% to the first defendant and 40% to the claimant. The claimant was therefore entitled to 60% of the full value of his damages.