Revenue And Customs, R (On the Application Of) v HM Coroner for the City of Liverpool

The Crown is bound by legislation where it is expressly named or where binding it follows by necessary implication from the statute’s purpose understood in context. The test is not satisfied merely because the legislation would operate less efficiently without Crown participation or was enacted for the public good. The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Convention do not alter or weaken that test, although they form part of the context. Schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 binds the Crown because excluding Crown bodies would frustrate the statutory purpose of equipping coroners to conduct effective investigations, including those engaging Article 2 obligations. A disputed coronial notice cannot simply be ignored: it must be challenged with the coroner, complied with while preserving the objection, or met with an application for interim relief.

HMRC sought judicial review of notices issued by the senior coroner requiring an occupational history concerning a deceased man whose death might have resulted from industrial disease. The notices were issued under Schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. HMRC relied on its statutory confidentiality obligations under the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, arguing that Schedule 5 did not bind the Crown. The principal issue was whether the Schedule bound the Crown by necessary implication. Alternative disclosure gateways and the proper interim response to a disputed notice were also considered.

1. Claim dismissed. The court held that Schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 binds the Crown by necessary implication. The notices therefore constituted orders of court within section 18(2)(e) of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005. HMRC was both bound and entitled to comply, and its confidentiality duty was displaced.
2. The governing test, stated in Province of Bombay v Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay [1947] AC 58, is whether the true legislative purpose, ascertained from the statute understood in context, would otherwise be frustrated. The court rejected a lower threshold based on reasonable efficiency or the public-good character of legislation. The authorities concerning statutory construction, including BBC v Johns (Inspector of Taxes) [1965] Ch 32, Lord Advocate v Dumbarton District Council [1990] 2 AC 580, Soden v Burns [1996] 1 WLR 1512 and Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10, did not dilute that approach.
3. The history and purpose of the 2009 Act showed that Schedule 5 was intended to strengthen coroners’ investigative powers and support effective investigations, including those required by Article 2. Excluding HMRC and other Crown emanations would create an incoherent distinction and frustrate that purpose. The court declined to leave individual coroners to use section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 case by case.
4. The alternative disclosure gateways under sections 18(2)(a), (b) and (h) of the 2005 Act would not have entitled HMRC to disclose the history on the facts. The court also held that a disputed Schedule 5 notice cannot be ignored. The recipient must question it, comply while preserving its position, or seek interim relief.